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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate political activity has been the subject of federal 
regulation since 1907,1 and the restrictions on corporate campaign 
contributions and other political expenditures continue to increase.2 
Most recently, Congress banned soft money donations in the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”),3 a ban upheld by 
the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC.4  Significantly, although the 
omnibus BCRA clearly was not directed exclusively at corporations, 
the Supreme Court began its lengthy opinion in McConnell by 
referencing and endorsing the efforts of Elihu Root, more than a 
century ago, to prohibit corporate political contributions.5  Repeatedly, 
 
 1. The Tillman Act made it unlawful “for any national bank or corporation . . . to make a 
money contribution in connection with any election to any political office.” Ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 
(1907) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1948) (repealed 1976)). The Federal Corrupt Practices Act 
extended the prohibition to “in kind” contributions. Ch. 368, § 302, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925). The 
Taft-Hartley Act broadened the ban to include expenditures in addition to contributions. Ch. 120, 
§ 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159-60 (1947). In 1976, the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) was 
amended to incorporate these restrictions. The FECA currently prohibits “any corporation 
whatever” from making a contribution or expenditure in connection with an election for federal 
office. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2005) (codified as amended). 
Corporate lobbying has been regulated by federal law since 1946. The Federal Regulation of 
Lobbying Act of 1946 required lobbyists to register and disclose their activities to Congress, 
although the Act contained many loopholes. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
No.104-65, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2005), replaced the 1946 statute and some related 
regulations with broader registration and disclosure requirements. The Act requires lobbyists to 
register, report the issues on which they lobby, and disclose the names of their clients along with 
their receipts and expenditures. See generally Frank J. Connors, Complying With the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995, 45 PRAC. LAW. 15 (1999) (explaining requirements of the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act). Corporations must register the lobbyists they employ and report the issues on 
which they lobby with an estimate of the total lobbying expenses incurred. Id. 
 2. The nature, extent and regulation of corporate political activity varies dramatically 
across countries. Compare Control of Political Donations, New Part XA, Companies Act, 1985 
(Eng.) (adopted as schedule 19 to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000) 
(adopting a new requirement of prior shareholder approval for corporate political contributions), 
with Michael Baume, Donated Dollars Make Business Sense, AUST. L. FIN. REV., Feb. 7, 2005, at 
63 (arguing that corporate failure to donate to political parties is “an abrogation of 
responsibility”) and Australian Election Commission, Summary of Donations Reported by 
Donors, http://fadar.aec.gov.au/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2005) (reporting corporate donations as high 
as AUD 800,000 for the 2003-2004 election year). This Article, by necessity, focuses on the U.S. 
experience. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (“BCRA”) (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq.). 
The BCRA also reduces corporate ability to engage in “issue advocacy” by broadening the 
definition of electioneering communications and prohibiting corporations from making such 
communications except through segregated funds. 
 4. 540 U.S. 93, 132-73 (2003). 
 5. Id. at 115. 
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within the broad context of campaign finance regulation, corporate 
contributions have been singled out as particularly problematic.6 
The federal regulatory scheme is based, in part, on the 
perception that corporations are able to use their substantial economic 
resources to influence public policy and thus distort the political 
process.7  At the same time, political activity is widely viewed as an 
illegitimate expenditure of corporate funds.  Thus, again in the first 
few lines of the McConnell decision, the Court quoted President 
Theodore Roosevelt’s statement that “‘directors should not be 
permitted to use stockholders’ money for political purposes.”8  
Similarly, the Court had previously characterized general corporate 
treasury funds spent on politics as being “diverted” from their proper 
use, indicating that political activity is not a legitimate business 
expenditure.9 
Media reports about corporate corruption of the political 
process have fed these concerns.  The press, for example, described 
Enron as buying legislative favors in exchange for political 
contributions.10  Studies claim that corporate donors use campaign 
contributions to purchase political influence.11  The media often 
structures these reports of corporate and other special interest 
political expenditures to produce heightened impact.  For example, the 
 
 6. See, e.g., id. at 205 (identifying “legislative judgment that the special characteristics of 
the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation”) (citations omitted); id. at 206 
(observing that “unusually important interests underlie the regulation of corporations’ 
campaign-related speech”). 
 7. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003) (describing ability of corporations to 
exert a potentially “deleterious” influence on political elections) (citation omitted); Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (“the unique state-conferred corporate 
structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent 
expenditures.”).  See generally Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, 
and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1108-23 (2002) (identifying 
and criticizing many of the traditional justifications for special regulation of corporate political 
activity). 
 8. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115 (internal quotations omitted). 
 9. See, e.g., Austin, 494 U.S. at 670-71 (“We thus adopted the ‘underlying theory’ of FECA 
‘that substantial general purpose treasuries should not be diverted to political purposes’”) 
(quoting 117 Cong. Rec. 43381 (1971) (statement of Rep. Hansen)); see also Beaumont, 539 U.S. 
at 163 (describing the use of corporate funds for political influence as a “temptation . . . quite 
possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members”). 
 10. See, e.g., Albert R. Hunt, Enron’s One Good Return: Political Investments, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 31, 2002, at A19 (describing Enron as receiving, in exchange for $6 million of political 
contributions “legislative favors, a lax oversight of its risky financial derivatives, tax breaks, 
unsurpassed input into the Cheney energy legislation drafting process and most of what it 
wanted, and reportedly even veto authority over regulatory appointees”). 
 11. See, e.g., Thomas Stratmann, What do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering 
Causal Effects of Money and Votes, 57 S. ECON. J. 606, 615 (1991) (finding that interest groups in 
the sugar industry were able to use political contributions to purchase legislative subsidies). 
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Wall Street Journal reported that 80% of the $314 million raised for 
the 2000 Bush presidential campaign came from “corporations and 
individuals employed by them.”12  In contrast, John de Figueiredo and 
Elizabeth Garrett reported that only 22% of the money contributed to 
the federal political campaigns in 2000 came from corporations, 
unions, and other interest groups and that the remaining vast 
majority came from small donations by individuals.13 
Despite the widespread reports of corruption, the empirical 
evidence is inconclusive.  Although some studies show a relationship 
between political contributions and legislative voting records, their 
findings demonstrate, at best, a correlation between contributions and 
voting patterns, rather than a causal relationship.  Many studies fail 
to find even a correlation.  A recent paper reviewing the results of 
approximately three dozen such studies reported that “[i]n three out of 
four instances, campaign contributions had no statistically significant 
effects on legislation or had the ‘wrong’ sign – suggesting that more 
contributions lead to less support.”14 
Additionally, the existing empirical research is 
methodologically limited.  Virtually all the studies use a large-scale 
“top down” approach that measures the correlation between corporate 
campaign contributions and particular policy decisions.  As I 
demonstrate in more detail in another work,15 this approach has the 
effect of excluding major components of corporate political activity, 
including expenditures that do not take the form of traditional 
campaign contributions as well as investments in corporate reputation 
and political relationships.  The empirical approach also diminishes 
the significance of corporate political capital as an intangible asset 
that provides corporations with long term value extending beyond an 
isolated policy issue.  More generally, the methodology does not allow 
researchers to look inside the black box to examine both the process by 
which corporations participate in the political process and the factors 
 
 12. Tom Hamburger et al., Influence Market: Industries that Backed Bush Are Now Seeking 
Return on Investment, WALL ST. J., March 6, 2001, at A1. The Journal itself acknowledged that 
this figure may be somewhat misleading in implying a relationship between corporations and 
corporate employees because the vast majority of individual contributors are employed by 
corporations. Id. 
 13. John de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics 11, 19 (USC Law & Public 
Policy Research Paper No. 04-19, 2004; Princeton Law and Public Affairs Paper No. 04-016, 
2004; and USC Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-19, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=578304. 
 14. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 105, 113-14 (2003). 
 15. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Corporate Investments in Politics: The Political Capital Index 
(2005) (unnumbered working paper, on file with author). 
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that influence whether such participation is effective.  Thus, 
notwithstanding the insights available through large-scale empirical 
research, the studies offer only a partial view of the corporate role in 
political decisionmaking.16 
This Article addresses these limitations by employing a 
different approach.  Responding to David Hart’s call for increased 
study of individual firms,17 the Article uses a case study methodology 
to examine the political activity of a single firm, Federal Express 
(“FedEx”), over a forty-year period.  Focusing primarily on the federal 
legislative process, the Article considers the business context 
surrounding FedEx’s political activity, the details of the legislative 
process, and the significant interest group participants, as well as 
traditional campaign finance materials.  An analysis of FedEx’s 
involvement in legislative policymaking reveals that corporate 
participation in politics extends beyond the purchase of political favors 
in a spot market.  The Article also demonstrates the relationship 
between FedEx’s political activity and its business operations.  In 
particular, it explores the manner in which FedEx has used its 
political influence to shape legislation and, in turn, the extent to 
which FedEx’s political successes have shaped its business strategy.18 
Despite regulators’ attempts to control corporate participation 
in politics, corporate political activity continues to increase.19  
Corporations appear increasingly aware of the importance of politics, 
and some corporations have found political naiveté to be commercially 
costly.20  Moreover, regulatory restrictions on one type of participation 
 
 16. In addition to their other limitations, the studies do not explore differences among 
individual firms in their quantity or type of political activity. See infra Part III (describing 
differences among firms). 
 17. David M. Hart, Business is Not an Interest Group (And, By the Way, There’s No Such 
Thing as “Business”): On the Study of Companies in American National Politics, 2004 ANN. REV. 
POLIT. SCI. 47, 47 (2004). 
 18. The selection of FedEx represents a conscious choice – FedEx is relatively more active 
and arguably more successful than many of its peers. See Neil A. Lewis, A Lobby Effort That 
Delivers the Big Votes; Federal Express Knows its Way Around Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 
1996, at 37 (describing FedEx as “one of the most formidable and successful corporate lobbies in 
the capital”). 
 19. Soft money donations, for example, increased from $86 million in 1992 to $495 million 
during the 2000 election campaign. Tom Hamburger, Broad Legal Attack May Undo Reform of 
Political Fund Raising, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2002, at A1. Edwin Epstein argues that restricting 
corporate political activity “has been ineffective because it disregards certain facts of life: the 
financial needs of the parties and candidates, and the political interests of business firms and the 
men who manage them.” EDWIN M. EPSTEIN, CORPORATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND POLITICAL 
CAMPAIGNS: FEDERAL REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 7 (1968). 
 20. For example, some commentators have attributed Microsoft’s antitrust problems, in 
part, to its lack of political participation. See John Simons & John Harwood, Gates Opening: For 
the Tech Industry, Market in Washington Is Toughest to Crack, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1998, at A1 
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simply channel corporate expenditures elsewhere.21  The growth in the 
use of soft money donations, for example, was a reaction to restrictions 
on other forms of corporate political expenditures.22  Similarly, 
commentators predict that corporations will respond to the soft money 
ban by making greater use of lobbyists and Political Action Committee 
(“PAC”) donations.23  Early responses appear consistent with this 
prediction.  Indeed, two days after the Supreme Court upheld the 
BCRA, Fannie Mae established a PAC, explicitly stating that its 
creation was a response to the soft money ban.24 
This Article argues that corporate demand for political activity 
is a natural response to the effect of legal rules on business 
operations.25  As a result, regulatory restrictions are more likely to 
restructure corporate political activity than to eliminate it.  
Nonetheless, commentators, without a full understanding of how and 
why corporations participate in politics,26 continue to propose new 
regulations.27 This Article takes the initial steps toward developing 
that understanding. 
 
(reporting that Congressman W.J. “Billy” Tauzin warned Microsoft CEO Bill Gates that he had 
to be “‘more active’ in Washington”); Hart, supra note 17, at 41-42 (stating that Microsoft 
“deliberately eschewed” political activity until the Justice Department’s 1998 lawsuit, which 
“finally prompted the firm to engage intensively with Washington”). Other firms have viewed the 
Microsoft experience as an indication to increase their levels of political activity. See, e.g., Greg 
Hitt, Cisco’s Chambers Revs Up Political-Contribution Engine, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2000, at A26 
(explaining how Cisco’s effort to build relationships with Washington politicians is “part of a 
corporate strategy aimed at keeping the maker of computer-networking products out of the sort 
of trouble now ensnaring Microsoft Corp., which a federal judge ordered split into two 
companies”). 
 21. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 165 (2003) (describing Congress as “[h]aving 
been taught the hard lesson of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance 
regulation”). 
 22. See id. at 650 (explaining that “[t]he solicitation, transfer, and use of soft money . . . 
enabled parties and candidates to circumvent FECA’s limitations on the source and amount of 
contributions in connection with federal elections”). 
 23. See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, Reform Changes the Balance of Power on K Street, THE 
HILL, March 20, 2002, at 37 (predicting that corporations will shift their expenditures to PAC 
donations and lobbying); Lawrence Noble, Looking at New Campaign Finance Landscape, THE 
HILL, March 20, 2002, at 41 (identifying a hard money alternative and speculating about other 
possible loopholes to evade new restrictions); Jill E. Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy from a 
Corporate Governance Perspective, 41 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1091, 1101-02 (1997) (explaining how 
corporations may use charitable donations as a substitute for political contributions). 
 24. Fannie Mae Sets Up PAC, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2003, at E02. 
 25. See Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Money and Institutional Power, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1673, 1703 (1999) (observing that regulatory limits create a disequilibrium between 
the demand and supply for political activity, and lead participants to respond to unmet demand 
either by evading the law or by packaging political activity in new ways). 
 26. Hart, supra note 17, at 43-45 (concluding that corporate political participation is poorly 
understood and proposing an agenda for future research). 
 27. See, e.g., de Figueiredo & Garrett, supra note 13, at 3-5 (advocating the adoption of an 
individual tax credit to stimulate individual political contributions as a counter to interest group 
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In Part I, this Article provides an overview of FedEx and 
describes how it has developed and applied its political capital.  In so 
doing, it reveals the range of mechanisms through which corporations 
can participate in the political process.  Part II presents a detailed 
case study of FedEx’s political participation in connection with several 
major regulatory changes, focusing on the business context in which 
FedEx’s activity was situated, the form of FedEx’s participation, and 
the consequences of FedEx’s political involvement.  Part III moves 
beyond the FedEx case to consider the broader implications of the case 
study for regulatory policy.  In particular, the Article concludes that 
political activity is not a dispersion of shareholder funds, but an 
integral and necessary part of a corporation’s operating strategy.  As a 
result, rather than trying to eliminate corporate political activity, 
reformers should focus on structuring regulation to increase the 
transparency and efficiency of corporate political expenditures. 
Several caveats are appropriate.  First, the political process is 
difficult to study.  There is little objective evidence as to the basis on 
which political actors make their decisions, and there are substantial 
reasons to question the proffered justifications for political actions.  
Where possible, this Article uses interviews with participants in the 
political process to supplement the media accounts and the recorded 
legislative history and to obtain a more complete understanding of the 
political process.28  The information obtained from these interviews, 
which were conducted on a nonattribution basis, is of course subject to 
the standard criticisms. Accordingly, any effort to discern causal 
relationships from the material in this Article is necessarily 
constrained. 
Second, even if it were possible to identify accurately the 
motives of the relevant political actors, legal change is the product of 
multiple factors; the impact of any individual factor is difficult to 
isolate.29  Economic factors, changes in social norms, shifts in the 
 
influence); David S. Gamage, Taxing Political Donations: The Case for Corrective Taxes in 
Campaign Finance, 113 YALE L.J. 1283, 1287 (2004) (proposing corrective taxes to reduce donor 
incentives to divert their political spending into “regulatory loopholes”). 
 28. During my tenure as Sloan Visiting Professor at Georgetown Law Center for the 2001-
2002 academic year, I conducted a series of interviews with current and former legislative 
staffers, lobbyists, and public officials. I have relied on these interviews primarily for background 
and to provide me with direction in identifying and understanding publicly available 
documentation. In some cases, specific interviews have included interesting characterizations or 
conclusions that I have referenced in this Article, employing the following citation form: “Hill 
Interview x, date.” 
 29. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the 
NLRB, 79 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 1094, 1095 (1985) (proposing a broader causal view of regulatory 
performance that integrates relationships with other political institutions, the economic 
environment, constituency relationships, and internal organizational factors). 
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balance of political power, international developments, and prominent 
current events contribute to regulatory change and affect the ability of 
a political participant or interest group to achieve its objectives.30  The 
magnitude of the problem increases with the length of time involved 
in securing legal change, because of the resulting increase in the 
number of factors that may play a role.31 
Finally, this Article characterizes the corporation as an entity 
and makes the simplifying assumption that corporations engage in 
political activity in order to further corporate objectives.32 Specifically, 
the Article does not address corporate political activity that results 
from management self-dealing.  As Roberta Romano observed, casual 
empiricism supports the argument that corporate political activity is 
primarily directed to profit maximization.33 Moreover, although 
corporate decisionmakers may engage in political activity designed to 
further their personal interests instead of the interests of the 
corporation,34 this agency problem is not unique to political activity 
but rather is common to all corporate decisionmaking.35 
 
 30. Thus, for example, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the decline in the 
takeover market in the early 1990s was due to regulatory changes that made takeovers more 
difficult as opposed to changes in the economic climate. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, A Guide to 
Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG.  119, 178 (1992) (observing that 
the “collapse of the junk bond market and the corresponding credit crunch, caused by banking 
and financial services sector weakness and new government policies restricting financial 
institutions’ holding of high yield debt, surely contributed to the decline in takeovers”). 
 31. See Hart, supra note 17, at 21 (explaining the problems associated with predicting the 
results of political activity because “[p]olitics is notoriously fickle”). 
 32. Moreover, it is unnecessary, for purposes of this article to address the normative debate 
between shareholder primacy, which typically accepts profit maximization as the sole legitimate 
corporate objective, and the competing progressive view which advocates greater emphasis on 
the interests of nonshareholder constituencies, even if such emphasis sacrifices corporate profits.  
See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 277, 280-82 
(1998) (describing the shareholder primacy norm and contrasting it with the progressive view). 
 33. Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 995-96 
(1984); see also id. at 994-95 (rejecting agency cost justifications for restricting corporate political 
activity). 
 34. See generally Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under 
the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981) (identifying agency problems in corporate political 
action and arguing that managers will pursue their political interests at the expense of the 
shareholders). 
 35. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (describing separation of ownership and control and the resulting 
agency costs created by the empowerment of management relative to shareholders); Jill E. Fisch, 
Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, 34 GA. L. REV. 745, 747 (2000) 
(describing corporate governance mechanisms addressed to agency problems caused by the 
separation between ownership and control). I have argued elsewhere that corporate law should 
be used to address agency problems associated with corporate political activity. See generally Jill 
E. Fisch, Frankenstein’s Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to Regulation of 
Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587 (1991) (arguing that corporate 
political activity should be addressed through corporate law rather than campaign finance law). 
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I.  FEDEX AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL CAPITAL 
FedEx is a well-known corporate success story.  Founder 
Frederick (“Fred”) Smith initially developed the concept of bringing a 
new methodology to the historically unprofitable air cargo industry as 
a college project at Yale,36 for which he reportedly, albeit inaccurately, 
received a grade of “C”.37  Formed in 1971, FedEx’s first day of service 
was April 17, 1973, on which it operated ten planes that carried 
eighteen packages.38  Since that time, FedEx has grown to a company 
with annual revenues of $24.7 billion39 and 245,000 employees 
worldwide.40  Less than ten years after its formation, FedEx was 
recognized as the dominant player in the overnight delivery business, 
surpassing larger and more established competitors, such as UPS. 41 
Today, FedEx is the largest and most successful global transportation 
company in the world.42 
At the same time, FedEx has developed a reputation as an 
active and successful participant in the political process.  This Part 
provides an overview of some of the ways that FedEx has developed its 
political capital.  The list is illustrative, not exhaustive; the discussion 
in this Part is intended to demonstrate the range of activities, beyond 
campaign contributions, that have contributed to FedEx’s reputation 
as a political player.  Although FedEx’s level of political participation 
is high, its efforts are not unique—corporations commonly use these 
types of actions to build political capital. 
FedEx’s reputation is based, in part, on its political 
expenditures.  In campaign contributions alone, FedEx consistently 
places near the top of the list of donors.43  In recent years, FedEx’s soft 
 
 36. Stuart Auerbach, Big Delivery Firms Maneuver for Position; Companies Striving For 
Bigger Share of Busy Washington Market, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1988, at F1. 
 37. Id. In a recent interview, Smith explained that the myth surrounding the original 
project has become exaggerated and that, in fact, he does not remember the precise grade that he 
received on the paper. See Dean Foust, No Overnight Success; Frederick Smith’s FedEx Sparked 
a Revolution in Just-in-time Delivery, BUS. WK., Sept. 20, 2004 (quoting Smith as explaining that 
his efforts to correct the story have been unsuccessful). 
 38. Carol Shifrin, No Passenger Service Seen by Air Carrier, WASH. POST, June 25, 1980, at 
E5. 
 39. FedEx, Annual Report, at 7 (2004), available at http://www.fedex.com/us/ 
investorrelations/financialinfo/2004annualreport/ [hereinafter FedEx Annual Report]. 
 40. Today’s FedEx, http://www.fedex.com/us/about/today/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 
2005). 
 41. Shifrin, supra note 38. 
 42. FedEx Chairman Undergoes Successful Bypass Surgery; Prognosis for Frederick W. 
Smith is Excellent, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 25, 2000. 
 43. For example, statistics from the Center for Responsive Politics place FedEx 29th in the 
list of top overall donors in the 2000 election cycle, and 55th in 2002. Center for Responsive 
Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/topcontribs.asp?Cycle=2000&Bkdn= DemRep and 
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money, PAC, and lobbying expenditures totaled more than $6 million 
per election cycle.44 
 
FedEx 1999-2000 Soft Money 1,327,60045 
FedEx PAC 1999-2000 Disbursements 2,065,59846 
FedEx Corp. Lobbying 2000 Expenditures 3,320,00047 
 
FedEx’s investment in political capital extends beyond  
monetary donations.48  FedEx has carefully developed its reputation in 
Washington.  Founder and CEO Fred Smith has maintained an active 
presence in Washington politics since founding the company; he 
travels to Washington once a month to meet with political officials and 
testifies regularly before Congress.49  As early as 1976, Smith testified 
before Congress on at least five separate occasions within a six month 
 
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/topcontribs.asp?cycle=2002 (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). 
According to the Federal Election Commission’s website, FedExPac ranked 30th in contributions 
to candidates and 39th in overall disbursements in the 1999-2000 election cycle, and 36th in 
contributions to candidates and 39th in overall disbursements in the 1997-98 election cycle. 
Federal Election Commission, http://www.fec.gov/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2005); see also Nancy 
Zuckerbrod, FedEx Tops Slate of State Soft Money Donors, COM. APPEAL, Mar. 12, 2000, at A10 
(reporting that FedEx ranked first among Tennessee soft money donors). 
 44. The dollar amounts indicated in the table understate FedEx’s political expenditures for 
various reasons. For instance, corporations are not required to quantify the costs of lobbying by 
in-house personnel. FedEx has a Washington office which, in 2000, was staffed by five full-time 
personnel who engaged primarily in lobbying. Other FedEx personnel, including CEO Fred 
Smith, devoted substantial time to political participation. Also not included in the figures is the 
approximately $77,000 of contributions made by individual FedEx officers and employees during 
the 2000 election cycle. Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture 
/topcontribs.asp?Bkdn= Source&Cycle=2000 (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). 
 45. Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/softmoney/softcomp1.asp?txt 
Name=fedex (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). 
 46. Center for Responsive Politics, http://opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.asp?strid= 
C00068692&cycle=2000 (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). PAC expenditures for subsequent years have 
increased. Id. at http://opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.asp?strid=C00068692&cycle=2002 and 
http://opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.asp?strid=C00068692&cycle=2004 (reporting PAC 
disbursements of $2,935,330 for 2001-2002, and $2,832,787 for 2003-2004 through Oct. 13, 2004). 
 47. Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/lobby00/topind09.asp 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2005). Importantly, FedEx conducts a substantial percentage of its lobbying 
through the use of in-house lobbyists – those expenditures need not be quantified and are not 
included in the reported total. See id. (providing a detailed breakdown of FedEx’s 2000 lobbying 
expenditures). 
 48. See generally John M. de Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, The Structure and Conduct of 
Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission, 10 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. STRAT. 91 (2001) (recognizing that PAC contributions are a poor proxy for a firm’s 
political activity and instead measuring lobbying by identifying the number of contacts made by 
a firm or trade association with the targeted government agency). 
 49. Dave Hirschman, Air Express, Two Companies’ Political Donations Zoom, COM. APPEAL, 
Oct. 30, 1994, at 1C. 
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period in connection with legislative proposals to deregulate the air 
cargo industry.50  Washington insiders identify Smith’s reputation and 
interest in politics as a substantial factor in FedEx’s political 
success.51 
FedEx has also cultivated relationships with Washington 
insiders.  Smith’s ties to prominent political figures are extensive.52 
Smith is reportedly on a first name basis with many members of 
Congress53 and has enjoyed strong ties with several presidents.54 
Smith’s relationship with Bill Clinton led Clinton to include Smith in 
the official delegation on a trade mission to China.55  At the same 
time, Smith continues to maintain his relationship with fraternity 
 
 50. Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of 
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 548 (1976) (Statement of Frederick W. Smith); 
Aviation Economics: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Review and the 
Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 94th Cong. 391 
(1976) (statement of Frederick W. Smith); Reform of the Economic Regulation of Air Carriers: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and 
Transportation, 94th Cong. 949 (1976) (testimony of Frederick W. Smith); Amend the Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958, Relating to Granting Relief by Exemption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 8 (1976) (statement of Frederick W. 
Smith); To Broaden the Power of the Civil Aeronautics Board to Grant Relief by Exemption in 
Certain Cases: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works 
and Transportation, 94th Cong. 44 (1976) (Testimony of Frederick W. Smith); see also James W. 
Brosnan & Anna Davis, FedEx Powers Up for Fight in Congress, Postal Service a Major Target, 
COM. APPEAL, Dec. 28, 1996, at 1A (noting that Smith usually testifies before Congress at least 
once per year). 
 51. See Hill Interview I, Jan. 31, 2002, supra note 28 (describing Fred Smith as a “big piece” 
of FedEx’s success); Hill Interview II, Jan. 31, 2002, supra note 28 (explaining that Fred Smith 
had credibility in Washington starting from his involvement in air cargo deregulation when he 
“did what he said he would do”); Hill Interview IV, Apr. 12, 2002, supra note 28 (describing 
Smith as “the best lobbying tool that FedEx has”). 
 52. The personal involvement of a firm’s CEO appears to be a significant factor in conveying 
the importance of policy issues to political officials. In comparison to Smith, who has testified 
regularly before Congress, the testimony of UPS Chairman Kent Nelson before a House 
subcommittee in 1996 marked the first appearance before Congress of a UPS chairman in the 
company’s 89 year history. Postal Service Reform: Hearing of the Postal Service Subcomm. of the 
House Government Reform and Oversight Comm., 104th Cong. (1996) (Testimony of Ken C. “Oz” 
Nelson). UPS’s chairmen also lacked the same public visibility as Fred Smith because Fred 
Smith had been FedEx’s chairman since the company’s inception, whereas UPS changed CEOs 
frequently. Hill Interview IV, Apr. 12, 2002, supra note 28. Similarly, CEO Kenneth Lay’s 
political experience and involvement was likely a major factor in Enron’s political effectiveness. 
Tim Fleck & Brian Wallstin, Enron’s End Run, To Make a Mess as Big as the Enron Debacle, You 
Need Some Friends in High Places—Texas Senator Phil Gramm and His Wife, for Instance, 
DALLAS OBSERVER, Feb. 7, 2002; see also Hill Interview II, Jan. 31, 2002, supra note 28 
(describing Lay as actively engaged in Washington politics). 
 53. See, e.g., Yankee Haylift ‘Not Cost Effective’; UPI, July 24, 1986, AM cycle [hereinafter 
Yankee Haylift] (describing Smith as a “friend” of then Massachusetts Senator John Kerry); see 
also Hill Interview IV, Apr. 12, 2002, supra note 28 (explaining that Smith established good 
relationships with many members of Congress over the years). 
 54. Michael Steel & Richard H.P. Sia, FedEx Flies High, 33 Nat. J. 554 (2001).   
 55. Id.   
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brother George W. Bush.56  Smith joined former Senator Bob Dole as 
co-chairman of the National World War II Memorial Campaign in 
1997.57  
Other examples of Smith’s efforts to build relationships with 
political leaders include his sponsorship of a Congressional Black 
Caucus Foundation reception to honor Congressman Harold Ford 
Jr.,58 serving as campaign chairman for Tennessee Senator James 
Sasser’s, albeit unsuccessful, re-election bid,59 and his work for former 
Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist’s 1994 gubernatorial campaign.60 
Most recently, as the BCRA imposed new limits on FedEx’s ability to 
make soft money contributions, Smith has increased his leadership 
role to include personally hosting fundraising events.61  The 2004 
Bush-Cheney campaign designated Smith as a “Pioneer” due to his 
success in raising campaign funds by “bundling” the contributions of 
individual donors.62     
The company maintains a six person office in Washington, 
D.C., expressly dedicated to government affairs.63  Specifically, FedEx 
staffs this office with Washington insiders who have experience in key 
areas of lawmaking interest to the company, thus extending the scope 
of the company’s relationships.64  A. Doyle Cloud, FedEx’s Vice 
President for Government Affairs, headed the Washington, D.C. office 
for a considerable period of time.65  The office also includes David H. 
 
 56. Id.   
 57. World War II Memorial Campaign: Hearing before the Subcomm. on National Security, 
Veterans Affairs and International Relations of the House Comm. on Government Reform, 105th 
Cong. (2000) (Prepared Testimony of Major General John P. Herrling, USA (Ret) Secretary 
American Battle Monuments Comm’n) [hereinafter Herrling Testimony].  The memorial was 
completed in 2004.  Bartholomew Sullivan, Better Late Than Never – Emotional Ceremony 
Crowns WWII Memorial, COM. APPEAL, May 30, 2004, at A1.  Through Smith’s efforts, the 
campaign raised $100 million.  Steel & Sia, supra note 54.  FedEx led the corporate donors with 
a $2 million pledge.  Herrling Testimony, supra. 
 58. James W. Brosnan, Political Backs Get FedEx Scratch, COM.APPEAL, Sept. 28, 2003, at 
A1. 
 59. Hirschman, supra note 49.  Sasser subsequently became ambassador to China. 
 60. James W. Brosnan & Anna Davis, Lott Gripes Despite Party’s Slice of Business PAC Pie, 
GOP Gets Two-thirds of Funds from Memphis Firms, COM. APPEAL, Dec.27, 1996, at A1. 
 61. See id. (reporting on Smith’s co-hosting of a $2000 per person fund-raiser for President 
Bush with Vice President Cheney). 
 62. Oliver Staley, That’s a Bundle - 1 Ranger Can Deliver Many Checks, COM. APPEAL, Aug. 
27, 2004, at A1. 
 63. Paul Page, High-Stakes Lobbying Game Launched both Pro and Con US Air-BA Pact, 
TRAFFIC WORLD, Sept. 7, 1992, at 9. 
 64. In contrast, positions at some corporate government affairs offices are sinecures for 
senior officials who are nearing retirement. 
 65. See Steel & Sia, supra note 54. Cloud joined former Tennessee governor Don Sundquist 
and former Senator David Pryor, with whom Smith and FedEx had longstanding ties, to start a 
new DC lobbying firm. Personnel News, THE BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, July 16, 2003. Among 
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Pryor Jr., the son of former Senator and FedEx consultant David H. 
Pryor, D-Ark. 66 In 2002, FedEx hired Gina Adams, formerly a nine-
year Transportation Department counsel-advisor, to be vice president 
of the office.67 
In addition, FedEx values political expertise outside its 
Washington office.  Political leaders have consistently served on the 
board of directors, including Howard Baker, former senator;68 Charles 
Manatt, Washington lawyer and former Democratic Party national 
chairman;69 George Mitchell, former Senate Majority Leader;70 and 
Shirley Jackson, RPI President and former member of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission.71  It is logical for FedEx to place a premium 
on political experience in selecting its board members; directors 
oversee a corporation’s strategic planning, and, for FedEx, the 
applicable regulatory environment has always been tied closely to the 
company’s business strategy.72 
FedEx supplements the efforts of its in-house personnel by 
making extensive use of outside lobbying firms.73  For example, FedEx 
has repeatedly hired the services of outside lobbyist Ann Eppard, 
longtime chief of staff to former House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee Chairman Bud Shuster.74  Other FedEx 
lobbyists have included G. Stewart Hall, former legislative director for 
Senator Richard C. Shelby, R-Ala. (chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee’s transportation panel), and Haley Barbour, former 
 
the firm’s first clients was the City of Columbus, to lobby for federal transportation money. 
Bonna de la Cruz, D.C. lobbying firm taps Sundquist as partner, TENNESSEAN, July 9, 2003, at 
2A. 
 66. Steel & Sia, supra note 54. Pryor’s brother Mark was elected to the Senate from 
Arkansas in 2002. 
 67. Simeon Booker, Ticker Tape, JET, Nov. 25, 2002, at 10. 
 68. Hirschman, supra note 49. Baker was also chief of staff for President Reagan. He served 
on the FedEx board from 1988 through 1997. Id. 
 69. Id. Manatt served on the FedEx board from 1989 through 1999, at which time he left to 
serve as U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic; he rejoined the FedEx board in 2004. 
FedEx Corp. Elects New Director; Annual Election of Directors Also Approved by Shareholders, 
BUS. WIRE, Sept. 27, 2004. 
 70. Mitchell has served on the board from 1995 through the present. FedEx Annual Report, 
supra note 39, at 78. 
 71. Michael Lollar, Barksdale, High Tech Expert, Joins FDX Board, COM. APPEAL, Sept. 28, 
1999, at B5. 
 72. See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Do Some Outside Directors Play a 
Political Role? 44 J. L. & ECON. 179, 179-80, 190 (2001) (identifying importance of political role of 
directors and demonstrating that corporations for which politics is more important are more 
likely to use directors who are adept at politics). 
 73. See Steel & Sia, supra note 54 (describing K street lobbying firms employed by FedEx). 
 74. Id. 
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Republican National Committee Chairman.75 FedEx regularly sends 
members of its government affairs office and other employees to meet 
with political leaders.  FedEx’s executives and lobbyists have strong 
reputations in Washington for being “well informed” and “very 
accessible.”76 
FedEx engages in a variety of activities to strengthen its 
relationships with political officials.  One important example is 
FedEx’s lawful practice of regularly making its corporate jets available 
to members of Congress so they can enjoy greater privacy and 
convenience while traveling, in many cases, to fundraising events.77  
Another example is FedEx’s $205 million purchase of the naming 
rights for FedEx field—the Washington Redskins’ football stadium.78  
Although a Memphis-based corporation would seemingly have little 
reason to identify itself publicly with a football team located in 
Washington, D.C., the transaction is rational as a massive lobbying 
expenditure.79  As Redskins vice president Pepper Rodgers stated, 
FedEx field is “where the majority of lobbying is done for Federal 
Express.”80   For the many politicians and political staffers who attend 
Redskins games, the FedEx name is regularly and visibly associated 
with the impressive new stadium, although presumably not with the 
somewhat erratic Washington Redskins.81   
FedEx has a reputation for going beyond mere advocacy in its 
political efforts.  FedEx regularly drafts legislation and provides 
research and other supporting information for government officials.82  
Additionally, FedEx is known for its ability to build coalitions within 
the industry.83  FedEx has built “rent chains,” enlisting constituencies 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., id. (quoting Wendell Moore, chief of staff to Tennessee Gov. Don Sundquist, 
who worked in Washington when Sundquist was a member of Congress); accord Hill Interview I, 
Jan. 31, 2002, supra note 28. 
 77. Lewis, supra note 18; see Hill Interview III, Apr. 12, 2002, supra note 28 (describing 
these trips, in which politicians are accompanied by FedEx officials, as an important way of 
building relationships and goodwill). 
 78. Eric Fisher, FedEx’s Pitch One of Most Expensive, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1999, at B1. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Brosnan & Davis, supra note 60.  
 81. Recently, FedEx also lent its skybox at the field to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist for 
a fund-raiser.  Brosnan, supra, note 58.   
 82. A corporation may be most effective in influencing legislative policy by presenting issue 
papers that inform a legislator on nonsalient political issues. Gerald D. Keim & Carl P. Zeithaml, 
Corporate Political Strategy and Legislative Decision Making: A Review and Contingency 
Approach, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 828, 840 (1986). 
 83. See id. (arguing that lobbying and PAC contributions are likely to be of limited 
effectiveness unless the corporation supports its efforts through coalition and constituency 
building). 
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such as customers and employees to demonstrate broader support for 
its initiatives.84 
FedEx is politically active, both as an individual firm and as a 
member of industry groups.85 FedEx has been an active participant in 
the powerful Air Transport Association (“ATA”),86 “the only trade 
organization for the principal U.S. airlines.”87  The ATA has 
influenced a variety of industry regulatory issues and spends over $1 
million a year on lobbying.88 Smith was elected to the ATA Board of 
Governors in 199189 and chaired the ATA’s executive committee.90  
Smith also spent a number of years on the Board of Governors for the 
International Air Transport Association,91 serving as Chairman of the 
Board from 1997-98.92  By participating in politics through trade 
groups, FedEx has been able to play a leadership role while reducing 
the visibility of its participation.93 
FedEx further enhances its reputation through a broad 
program of high profile charitable activities.  In 1986, FedEx donated 
the use of its jets to airlift hay to drought stricken South Carolina, 
earning the long term loyalty of South Carolina Democratic Senator 
 
 84. See DAVID P. BARON, BUSINESS AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 223 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining the 
concept of “rent chains” and applying it to FedEx); see also Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 
Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy, 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 561, 
563-65 (2004) (describing other nonmarket strategies through which corporations can influence 
the lobbying behavior of other interest groups, thereby increasing the effectiveness of their own 
lobbying). 
 85. Campaign finance literature notes that corporations can participate in politics both 
individually and collectively. See, e.g.,  de Figueiredo & Tiller, supra note 48 (identifying the 
failure of existing literature to address decisions by firms as to whether to organize their 
lobbying through a collective body such as a trade association). 
 86. Air Transport; Shortlines, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 29, 1982, at 33. 
 87. Air Transport Association, What is the ATA?, http://www.airlines.org/ 
about/d.aspx?nid=978 (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). The ATA “represent[s] the industry on major 
aviation issues before Congress, federal agencies, state legislatures, and other governmental 
bodies.” Id. 
 88. Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbyist Spending: Air Transport, http://www. 
opensecrets.org/lobbyists/indusclient.asp?code=M01&year=2000 (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). 
 89. Names in Aviation, Organizations, 306 AVIATION DAILY 515, Dec. 23, 1991. 
 90. The International Air Cargo Association, Frederick W. Smith: Founder and Chairman of 
Federal Express, http://www.tiaca.org/content/inductees/Fred_W_Smith.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 
2005). 
 91. The IATA is a trade association that brings together approximately 270 airlines from 
around the world. IATA, About Us, http://www.iata.org/about/index (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). 
 92. IATA, Annual Report (1998), available at http://www.iata.org/NR/ContentConnector/ 
CS2000/SiteInterface/sites/about/file/ar98.pdf. Smith was the first executive from a cargo carrier 
to hold the position. FedEx’s Taylor Resigns, TRAFFIC WORLD, Nov. 18. 1996, at 64. 
 93. See de Figueiredo & Tiller, supra note 48 (observing that large firms may effectively 
reduce freeriding by lobbying through trade associations when there are shared interests among 
association members). 
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Ernest F. (“Fritz”) Hollings.94  The drought, which stretched across 
eight southern states, was the worst since the 1930s and threatened 
the agricultural industry with $2 billion in losses.95  Although the 
drought drew a response from volunteers around the country, FedEx’s 
actions gained particular salience when the company was publicly 
portrayed as solving a serious problem created by political squabbling.  
Senator Hollings publicly stated that FedEx responded when the 
White House refused to authorize the use of military planes to 
transport hay donations arranged by Democratic lawmakers.96   
In 1987, FedEx delivered sophisticated drilling equipment to 
Midland, Texas, to help save eighteen-month-old Jessica McClure 
after she fell down a well.97  In 1995, FedEx and the American Red 
Cross created a strategic alliance which, in addition to involving 
substantial monetary gifts by FedEx to the Red Cross, involved the 
use of FedEx transport services to assist Red Cross relief efforts in 
connection with disasters and national emergencies.98  Although 
FedEx’s activities in connection with this program are too numerous 
to list, examples include FedEx’s donation of its aircraft to transport 
clothing and supplies to earthquake victims in El Salvador in 2001,99 
and its assistance to flood victims in Florida and tornado survivors in 
the South in 2000.100  FedEx also volunteered its jets in December 
2000, to fly celebrity panda bears, Tian Tian and Mei Xiang, from 
China to the National Zoo in Washington.101 
Beyond philanthropy, FedEx has built a reputation as a good 
corporate citizen.  The company regularly appears in listings such as 
Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For.”102  FedEx provides a 
 
 94. Robert Novak, Senate Democrats’ Betrayal of Labor is Telling Tale of how Washington 
Works, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 3B. 
 95. Keith Schneider, Farm Loss is Put at Over $2 Billion in Drought Region, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 26, 1986, at A1. 
 96. Id.; see Yankee Haylift, supra, note 53 (reporting that President Reagan refused to 
provide military planes because “it wouldn’t be efficient”). 
 97. Mede Nix, Midland Responds to Jessica’s Need, UPI, Oct. 18, 1987, AM Cycle. 
 98. Federal Express and the American Red Cross Announce Strategic Community-Oriented 
Alliance: FedEx Kicks Off Relationship with Special Valentine’s Gift to the American Red Cross, 
BUS. WIRE, Feb. 14, 1995. 
 99. Christopher Barton, Help is on the Way: Nike, FedEx Workers Supply Quake Victims, 
COM. APPEAL, Feb. 3, 2001, at C1. FedEx also donated employee services and money to the relief 
effort. Id. 
 100. See Steel & Sia, supra note 54. 
 101. FedEx to Handle China-U.S. Panda Lift, J. COM., Nov. 22, 2000 (describing how FedEx 
transported the pandas and paid for special containers for the trip). FedEx also renamed its 
transporting plane “FedEx PandaOne.” Id. 
 102. See Robert Levering & Milton Moskowitz, The 100 Best Companies To Work For in 
America, FORTUNE, Jan. 12, 2000, at 82 (reporting FedEx as ranking 59th in 1999 and 79th in 
1998); FedEx High On Fortune’s ‘Best’, COM. APPEAL, Dec. 20, 1997, at B3 (reporting FedEx 
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variety of benefits to employees including “free trips on FedEx 
planes . . . no-layoff[s], promotion-from-within and tuition-assistance 
policies, a universal profit-sharing plan and an open-door grievance 
system.”103  FedEx consistently ranks high in customer satisfaction as 
well.104 
II.  FEDEX AND REGULATORY CHANGE: THE NATURE AND ROLE OF 
POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
This Part analyzes FedEx’s political participation in a series of 
major regulatory reforms.  Obviously, large public corporations are 
affected by many legal issues; this Article focuses on how FedEx 
participated in the creation of several pieces of federal legislation that 
were of key importance to its business activities.  FedEx has been 
involved in lawmaking efforts beyond the scope of this case study, 
including its participation in state regulatory change (in addition to 
trucking deregulation which is discussed in Section III.B infra) and 
activities directed at the Executive Department.  With respect to the 
latter, FedEx’s efforts to obtain greater access to foreign routes have 
been of particular importance.105  A corporation’s litigation strategy 
also relates to its role in legislative lawmaking.  This Part highlights 
several such connections but does not evaluate FedEx’s litigation 
activities independently. 
For each issue examined in this case study, the Article 
considers the nature of the regulatory changes sought by FedEx, the 
relationship between the applicable legal rules and FedEx’s business 
operations, the methods employed by FedEx to obtain the change, the 
result of these efforts, and the significance of the issue for the 
company.  In particular, the Article considers the role of money in the 
 
placed 18th on Fortune’s Inaugural List of the 100 Best Companies to work for). Kevin 
McKenzie, FedEx in Top 10 for Information Systems Positions, COM. APPEAL, May 30, 1998, at 
B3  (noting that FedEx is a leading employer in the transportation industry and describing a 
new Computerworld survey ranking the company as one of the 10 best places to work in 
information systems). 
 103. Mary Deibel, But Some Companies are Finding; Happy Workers Cheer Bottom Line, 
PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 23, 2000, at 2H. 
 104. See, e.g., Mail Center Miscellany, MAIL CENTER MGMT. REP., July 2001, at 8 (reporting 
that FedEx ranked first among express carriers in customer satisfaction according to the 
American Customer Satisfaction Index produced by the National Quality Research Center at the 
University of Michigan Business School). 
 105. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Clinton Met Campaign Donor to Discuss a Trade Dispute, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997, at A19 (describing meeting between FedEx CEO Smith and President 
Clinton regarding Japan’s restrictions on air cargo flights). Because these efforts include 
processes such as international trade and treaty negotiation, they differ in several ways from the 
regulatory issues considered in this Article. 
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process, the participation of significant interest groups, and the 
importance of the other types of political participation described in 
Part I above. 
A.  Air Cargo Deregulation 
Any analysis of FedEx’s political activity must start with air 
cargo deregulation because this development was critical for FedEx to 
operate as a viable business.  When Smith founded FedEx in 1971, the 
airline industry was extensively regulated.106  Most commercial 
airlines were subject to the restrictive regulations of the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (“CAB”) which made rates and routes subject to 
CAB approval.107  New entrants had to undergo burdensome 
certification procedures, after which they were subject to CAB 
regulation.108  Critics charged that the CAB generally kept rates 
unreasonably low and routinely refused requests by carriers to expand 
into new markets.109  Initially, FedEx was able to avoid these 
regulations by carrying cargo in small Falcon jets under an exemption 
designed to permit air taxi operations.110  Using small aircraft to 
deliver cargo was inefficient,111 however, and FedEx hovered near 
bankruptcy for its first few years of operation.112  Indeed, Smith 
 
 106. Stephen A. Alterman, Safety in the All-Cargo Air Carrier Industry, 25 TRANSP. L. J. 153, 
153-54 (1998). 
 107. Id. at 154. 
 108. See, e.g., Amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Relating to Granting Relief by 
Exemption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th 
Cong. 57 (1976) (Statement of Leo Seybold, Vice President, Federal Affairs, Air Transport Assoc. 
of America) [hereinafter Seybold Testimony] (describing burdens associated with the certification 
process, including the need for the applicant to meet the burden “of showing that the public 
convenience and necessity require the certification”). 
 109. See Rush Loving, Jr., A Tiger with Air Cargo by the Tail, FORTUNE, June 19, 1978, at 
116 (explaining how CAB’s restrictions over rates and expansion into new markets crippled 
growth of the air cargo industry and prevented carriers from operating freight shipping 
profitably). 
 110. Alterman, supra note 106, at 154 n.3. Even for this first step, Smith had to persuade the 
government to increase the permitted payload for air taxis. See Dave Hirschman, Air Express 
Firms have Opposing Approaches, but Same Political Goal, COM. APPEAL, Oct. 30, 1994 at 4C 
(describing Smith’s success in obtaining this change in 1972). 
 111. See Why Airlines Fear the “Federal Express Bill,” BUS. WK., Sept. 13, 1976, at 116 
[hereinafter Why Airlines Fear the FedEx Bill] (stating that, between 1965 and 1975, the nation’s 
three all cargo airlines had accumulated $210 million in pretax losses). 
 112. See Good Ideas And Big Money Aren’t All You Need, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1975, at 30 
(stating that FedEx suffered through $29 million in operating losses and was near bankruptcy 
twice in its first 3 ½ years of operation). 
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reported that he flew to Las Vegas in 1973 to play blackjack in an 
effort to generate the cash to keep the company solvent.113 
When the CAB denied FedEx’s request to extend the exemption 
to bigger planes, Smith went to Washington.114  He lobbied 
extensively115 and testified before Congress,116 seeking modification of 
the law so as to enable FedEx to operate larger aircraft and to expand 
into new markets.  Some reports describe air cargo deregulation as an 
easy political battle.117  Smith found several strong allies for his cause, 
including CAB Chair Alfred Kahn, who viewed the Cargo Act as the 
first step in his effort to deregulate the airline industry, and the 
National Industrial Traffic League—the most prestigious association 
of shippers.118  Many academics also supported airline deregulation.119 
Nonetheless, air cargo deregulation was not without opponents.  
The natural foes to deregulation were the large combination carriers 
that transported both cargo and passengers; in 1977, these carriers 
transported more than 80% of the air cargo.  Some of these carriers 
opposed the legislation, arguing that without CAB regulation freight 
operations would be unprofitable.120  In addition, airlines feared that 
air cargo deregulation might set a dangerous precedent for the entry 
of new airlines without CAB approval.121  These concerns were 
reflected in the position of the ATA, which “strongly oppose[d]” the 
proposed legislation.122  ATA Director of Cargo Services G. J. Godbout 
 
 113. Foust, supra note 37. Smith was successful; “he wired the $27,000 he won back to 
FedEx.” Id. 
 114. Rosalind K. Ellingsworth, Two Cargo Carriers Back Deregulation, AVIATION WK. & 
SPACE TECH., May  3, 1976, at 27. 
 115. See id. (describing Smith’s heavy lobbying in favor of the bill). 
 116. Smith testified on several occasions in connection with air cargo deregulation. See  
supra note 50 (citing testimony). 
 117. See Why Airlines Fear the FedEx Bill, supra note 111 (describing “Most of Capitol Hill” 
as agreeing with Smith regarding the need for air cargo deregulation). 
 118. See id. (describing support of CAB and National Industrial Traffic League for 
deregulation). 
 119. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 317-18 (1982) (describing 
academic studies demonstrating the anti-competitive effects of airline regulation). See generally 
G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY AND 
POLICY (1974) (supporting deregulation). 
 120. Deregulation Arrives for Cargo Flights, BUS. WK., Nov. 21, 1977, at 55 [hereinafter 
Deregulation Arrives].  For most combination carriers, however, air cargo represented a very 
small portion of their business and was not economically significant. See MARTHA DERTHICK & 
PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 17-18 (1985) (explaining that several major 
carriers found cargo so unprofitable that they had ceased to carry it by the mid 1970s and that 
other combination carriers were “indifferent to cargo deregulation”). 
 121. Why Airlines Fear the FedEx Bill, supra note 111. 
 122. See Seybold Testimony, supra note 108, at 56. 
  
1514 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:5:1495 
warned that the legislation “could tear down the whole air cargo 
system.”123 
A potentially more substantial obstacle was the Flying Tiger 
Line, Inc., which at the time was the world’s largest all-cargo 
airline.124  Unlike FedEx, Flying Tiger decided to fly bigger aircraft.  
As a result, it obtained certification and was subject to CAB rate and 
route regulation.125  Although Flying Tiger acknowledged that the 
CAB approval process was often inefficient,126 it opposed FedEx’s 
efforts to evade the existing regulatory hurdles by pressing for 
deregulation.  As Flying Tiger President Robert W. Prescott testified, 
“We want them to go through the stresses and strains of certification 
the same as the rest of us.  We do not believe they are privileged 
characters straight out of Heaven.”127  Smith’s first legislative 
proposal died in the House Subcommittee on Aviation, which was 
chaired by Representative Glenn Anderson from Southern 
California—the location of Flying Tiger’s headquarters.128 
FedEx also battled the perception that air cargo deregulation 
was special interest legislation. Whatever the public interest value of 
deregulation might have been, participants in the political process 
recognized that the legislation was promoted by and principally 
designed to benefit FedEx, so much so that the bill was widely known 
in Washington as the “Federal Express Act.”129  Robert Prescott 
described the bill to Congress as “an insurance policy that covered a 
man only if he were riding a one-eyed buffalo over the Brooklyn 
Bridge at high noon on the Fourth of July.”130 
 
 123. See Why Airlines Fear the FedEx Bill, supra note 111. 
 124. Shipping Giant Claims Mail Carrier Overstepping Bounds, BUS. WK., Nov. 21, 1977 at 
55. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See, e.g., To Broaden the Power of the Civil Aeronautics Board to Grant Relief by 
Exemption in Certain Cases: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on 
Public Works and Transportation, 94th Cong. 100, 116 (1976) (testimony of Robert W. Prescott) 
[hereinafter Prescott Testimony] (explaining that Flying Tiger was flying with wasted space from 
Chicago to Anchorage due to the CAB’s refusal to authorize it to serve Anchorage). 
 127. Id. at 120; see id. at 103 (“Nor do we believe that a case has been made for an immediate 
and partial deregulation limited to domestic airfreight”); see also Hill Interview III, Apr. 12, 
2002, supra note 28 (describing Flying Tiger’s opposition to deregulation because it already had 
the authority to fly larger aircraft). 
 128. Robert J. Flaherty, Breathing Under Water, FORBES, Mar. 1, 1977, at 36. 
 129. See, e.g., William K. Ris, Jr., The ICC and the Transportation Deregulation Statutes, 16 
TRANSP. L. J. 125 (1987) (explaining the appellation as based on both “the speed by which it flew 
through Capitol Hill and the identity of its principal sponsor”). 
 130. Prescott Testimony, supra note 126, at 118. 
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Despite these obstacles, FedEx’s efforts to obtain legal change 
were successful.131  In 1977, Congress enacted and President Carter 
signed the Air Cargo Deregulation Act (“ACDA”).132  The statute 
created substantial new opportunities for the development of the air 
cargo industry through deregulation by broadly facilitating 
competition within the industry.  In particular, the statute granted 
certified carriers—those recognized by the CAB as “fit, willing and 
able”—complete freedom to enter domestic markets and to charge any 
nonpredatory rates.133 
The legislation also provided specific benefits tailored to 
FedEx.  As an existing air cargo company, FedEx immediately 
received nationwide cargo operating authority, including freedom from 
CAB regulation.  Moreover, the statute gave existing air cargo 
companies advantages over new entrants, including a one-year 
window during which they could enter new markets without 
competition.134 
FedEx quickly used its new ability to fly larger aircraft to 
expand its operations.135  By 1980, the regulatory changes had enabled 
FedEx to grow to a company with gross revenues of $415.4 million and 
net income of $38.7 million.  At the same time, the ACDA spawned the 
growth of an entire industry.  The success of the overnight express 
industry led one commentator to describe the Act as “an example of 
deregulation at its best.”136  In the twenty years after deregulation, 
the industry grew from essentially nothing “to the point where annual 
industry revenues exceed $30 billion, over 500,000 full-time 
equivalent workers are employed worldwide and over 800 large jet 
aircraft operate daily.”137 
How did FedEx accomplish this regulatory change?  FedEx’s 
sustained lobbying efforts were clearly a factor.138  Smith personally 
testified before congressional committees on more than a dozen 
 
 131. Commentators noted the speed with which Smith pushed the legislation through 
Congress. See Deregulation Arrives, supra note 120 (observing that “the cargo bill sailed through 
both houses of Congress by voice vote”). 
 132. Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).  
 133. Id. 
 134. Paul Stephen Dempsey, The State of the Airline, Airport & Aviation Industries, 21 
TRANSP. L. J. 129, 148 (1992). 
 135. See Dave Higdon, What Air Deregulation Has Meant, J. COM., Oct. 24, 1988, at 1A 
(explaining that FedEx “really surged into the overnight delivery business” in 1978 when it 
moved into larger aircraft). 
 136. Alterman, supra note 106, at 154. 
 137. Id. (observing, further, that the industry’s safety record has been excellent). 
 138. See Why Airlines Fear the FedEx Bill, supra note 111 (describing heavy lobbying by 
FedEx). 
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occasions, and a variety of FedEx officials participated in the 
deregulation efforts.  FedEx also recognized the importance of 
professional lobbyists and enlisted their efforts in its campaign.139  
Congressional staff members observed that FedEx did “an outstanding 
job” presenting its case to Congress.140  These efforts were supported 
by the relationships that FedEx already had begun to build with 
members of the congressional subcommittees on Aviation, whom 
FedEx recognized would continue to play an important role in 
evaluating regulatory changes that would affect its future.141 
Flying Tiger’s change in position also helped the success of the 
legislation.142 Although Flying Tiger initially opposed deregulation, 
shortly before Congress enacted the legislation, Flying Tiger officials 
testified in favor of the proposed statute, stating that “air cargo cannot 
be effectively regulated.”143  There are at least three possible 
explanations for this change in position.  First, Flying Tiger may have 
recognized that it was facing increasing competitive pressure from 
noncertificated carriers, such as FedEx, that were not subject to CAB 
restrictions.144  Second, Flying Tiger experienced a shift in leadership 
during this time period, as Executive Vice President and Chief 
Executive Officer Joseph Healy increasingly assumed responsibilities 
 
 139. See FedEx Challenges Postal Service Role; Shipping Giant Claims Mail Carrier 
Overstepping Bounds, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Jan. 4, 1997 (stating that since its beginning 
FedEx has employed a substantial staff of lobbyists). 
 140. David R. Griffiths, Price, Service, Capacity Gains Forecast in Cargo Deregulation, 
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 19, 1977, at 29 (quoting David Heymsfeld, assistant counsel, 
aviation, for the House Committee on Public works and transportation). 
 141. For example, Smith hosted members of the House Aviation Subcommittee and their 
staff for an evening at FedEx company headquarters, introducing the legislators to the 
company’s operations, and, presumably, enlisting their support. See Aviation Regulatory Reform: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and 
Transportation, 95th Cong. 1254 (1977) (statement of Rep. Milford, Member, House Subcomm. 
on Aviation) [hereinafter Aviation Regulatory Reform] (describing the committee’s visit to FedEx 
headquarters in Memphis). Congressman Milford further indicated his interest in encouraging 
FedEx to expand its operations to Forth Worth, Texas. 
 142. Significantly, when Flying Tiger changed its position, it further enlisted the support of 
its shipping customers. See id. at 1255, 1257 (Testimony of Joseph J. Healy, CEO, Flying Tiger 
Line, Inc.) (“[W]e have talked about deregulation to our customers, we have talked to our 
employees, we have talked to the unions that represent those employees, we have talked to our 
investors, and they all agree that deregulation will have a very positive impact on Flying Tigers 
Line, and totally support our efforts before Congress in this regard.”); Regulatory Reform in Air 
Transportation, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, 95th Cong. 499 (1977) (statement of J.W. Rosenthal, Counsel for 
Flying Tiger Line, Inc.) [hereinafter Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation] (describing Flying 
Tiger’s submission of over 240 letters from its customers, including air freight forwarders, 
supporting deregulation). 
 143. Aviation Regulatory Reform, supra note 141, at 1255 (testimony of Joseph J. Healy). 
 144. See id. at 1256 (describing Flying Tiger as “tak[ing] exception to . . . our inability to 
compete with [less regulated] service”). 
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formerly exercised by President and Founder Robert Prescott.145  
Healy’s research suggested that Prescott’s view of Flying Tiger’s 
ability to prosper under continued CAB regulation may have been 
misguided.146  Third, and perhaps most important, prior to the 
summer of 1977, FedEx and Flying Tiger decided to work together to 
draft proposed legislation that would be acceptable to both 
companies.147  The product was subsequently submitted to the 
relevant congressional committees and provided the basic structure 
for the eventual legislation.148 In particular, the joint proposal was the 
source of the special protection provided to existing carriers against 
competition from new entrants.149 
In addition, FedEx seemingly was able to overcome the 
legislation’s characterization as special interest by enlisting the 
support of Flying Tiger and others.150  In particular, FedEx 
demonstrated a public interest need for the regulation that extended 
beyond its own frustration with CAB regulation by building a broad 
coalition in support of deregulation.  The support of other interest 
groups lent credibility and political clout to FedEx’s proposal. 
What about the role of campaign contributions?  FedEx 
recognized the importance of political expenditures early in its history.  
In 1977, it established a PAC that, for the year 1977-78 made 
expenditures of $8,985.151 Because FedEx was initially unsuccessful in 
 
 145. See Underachiever, FORBES, Sept. 1, 1977, at 48 (describing leadership and gradual 
assumption of management by Healy); Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation, supra note 142, 
at 499 (statement of Joseph J. Healy) (noting that it was Healy’s first appearance before the 
committee). 
 146. Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation, supra note 142, at 497-98 (testimony of 
Joseph J. Healy). 
 147. Aviation Regulatory Reform, supra note 141, at 724, 727 (testimony of Joseph J. Healy); 
Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation, supra note 142, at 493 (statement of Frederick W. 
Smith). 
 148. Aviation Regulatory Reform, supra note 141, at 724, 727 (testimony of Joseph J. Healy); 
Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation, supra note 142, at 493 (statement of Frederick W. 
Smith). 
 149. See Aviation Regulatory Reform, supra note 141, at 734 (testimony of Joseph J. Healy) 
(defending an initial form of the provision that would have granted a three year head start to 
existing carriers Seaboard, Air Lift, FedEx and Flying Tiger). The provision was reduced to one 
year in the final statute. It appears that FedEx also agreed to support Flying Tiger’s efforts to 
extend deregulation to surface transport of air cargo as part of the joint proposal. Regulatory 
Reform in Air Transportation, supra note 142, at 493 (statement of Frederick W. Smith). 
 150. By gaining the support of Flying Tiger, FedEx was able to obtain Flying Tiger’s 
assistance with enlisting the support of its shippers. See supra note 142. 
 151. EDWARD ZUCKERMAN, THE ALMANAC OF FEDERAL PACS (1992). FedEx seems to have 
been one of the first industry participants to recognize the value of PAC expenditures. Flying 
Tiger made no PAC expenditures in 1977-78; of the passenger airlines, only United and Delta 
made PAC expenditures. Id. By 1979-80, following general airline deregulation, industry PAC 
expenditures had increased dramatically. Id. 
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obtaining relief from the regulatory restrictions of the CAB in 1975 
and 1976 but then, after establishing its PAC, was immediately 
successful in 1977, an empirical analysis of the role of money in the 
lawmaking process might conclude that FedEx’s decision to make 
political contributions was an important factor in its success.  As 
indicated above, it is precisely this type of analysis—focusing solely on 
monetary contributions and omitting the factors described above—
that leads to the conclusion that corporations are able to purchase 
favorable legislation.  Indeed, it is difficult to believe that FedEx’s 
contribution of less than $9,000 was a critical factor in the process. 
One might argue that FedEx’s contributions enabled it to 
obtain access.  The record, including Smith’s testimony, his role in 
drafting proposed legislation, and so forth, clearly reflects FedEx’s 
extensive access to the relevant congressional subcommittees.  On the 
other hand, the record reveals similar access for Flying Tiger which 
did not make any PAC expenditures during 1977-78, or anytime 
thereafter.152 Consequently it seems simplistic to view FedEx’s 
monetary donations as a key factor in deregulation.  
B.  Trucking Deregulation 
In latter stages of air cargo deregulation, FedEx and Flying 
Tiger raised the issue of trucking deregulation. As with air 
transportation, trucking was extensively regulated in the 1970s.  This 
regulation affected FedEx’s ability to transport packages to and from 
its aircraft.  Consequently, after air cargo deregulation, FedEx turned 
its attention to trucking deregulation.  Trucking deregulation occurred 
in two separate steps.  Initial deregulation of interstate trucking, step 
one, followed closely upon the heels of airline deregulation.  Two years 
after the Federal Express Act was signed into law, Congress passed, 
and President Carter signed, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 
(“MCA”).153  The MCA did not eliminate state authority to regulate 
intrastate trucking.  Full deregulation of intrastate trucking, step two, 
did not occur until 1995.154 
 
 152. Id. Flying Tiger officials testified on numerous occasions before the same subcommittees 
and worked together with FedEx in drafting proposed legislation. There are indications that 
Flying Tiger’s support for deregulation was a key factor in enabling the bill to move forward.  
 153. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 
U.S.C. (1982)). 
 154. Full deregulation was implemented as part of the Federal Aviation Administration 
Authorization Act of 1994, Pub.L. 103-305 (Mar. 1995), which became effective on Jan. 1, 1995. 
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1.  The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 
Trucking deregulation was a major issue for FedEx and Flying 
Tiger.155  Although pickup and delivery services incidental to air cargo 
transportation were supposedly exempt from the regulatory 
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) under the 
Interstate Commerce Act, the ICC claimed the authority to determine 
the scope of that exemption.156  For many years, the ICC interpreted 
the exemption according to a twenty-five mile rule—jointly developed 
by the CAB and the ICC—which exempted pickup and delivery service 
within twenty-five miles of the airport or the city served by the 
airport.157  In June 1979, the ICC adopted new rules extending the 
exempt region to a thirty-five mile plus thirty-five mile formula, which 
essentially created seventy mile service zones.158  The air terminal 
exemption zones provided air cargo carriers with some operational 
freedom, but their limitations severely obstructed service to a 
substantial part of the country.159 
Significantly, if FedEx wanted to provide service to a town or 
city outside the exempt zone, it could only do so at substantial 
additional cost by hiring an ICC certificated carrier.160  Perhaps more 
importantly, by preventing FedEx from using ground shippers or 
trucks that were within the company’s control, the requirement led to 
 
 155. See, e.g., Oversight of Freight Rate Competition in the Motor Carrier Industry: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th 
Cong. 1467 (statement of Wayne M. Hoffman, CEO, the Flying Tiger Line, Inc.) (advocating 
trucking deregulation); Examining Current Conditions in the Trucking Industry and the Possible 
Necessity for Change in the Manner and Scope of Its Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Surface Transportation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 96th Cong. 
1009 (1980) (testimony of Frederick W. Smith) [hereinafter Examining Current Conditions] 
(describing existing trucking regulations as “absurd”). 
 156. See, e.g., Examining Current Conditions, supra note 155, at 960 (statement of S. Tucker 
Taylor, Senior VP, Federal Express Corp.) (arguing that the ICC was improperly regulating air 
transportation by claiming the authority to adopt rules specifying the scope of the exempt zone). 
 157. Motor Transportation of Property Incidental to Transportation by Aircraft, 112 M.C.C. 
1, 16 (1970) (stating that any departure from the 25 mile rule “must be supported by compelling 
reasons”). 
 158. See Examining Current Conditions, supra note 155, at 960 (statement of S. Tucker 
Taylor) (describing expanded exempt zone). 
 159. See id. at 961 (explaining how FedEx could not provide service to Allentown, PA from 
Harrisburg, PA because the two cities are 72 miles apart). 
 160. See Regulation of Air Cargo Freight Transportation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. 
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong. 80 (1979) (statement of Frederick W. 
Smith) (explaining that, for “countless examples of shippers who are a few hundred yards, in 
some cases, or a mile or two outside the limit” that FedEx could legally serve, the use of a 
certificated carrier was required); see also Examining Current Conditions, supra note 155, at 
972-73 (statement of S. Tucker Taylor) (explaining the costs associated with using certificated 
carriers to provide trucking service). 
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a lack of predictability in operations that was inconsistent with the 
time sensitive nature of FedEx’s product.  As S. Tucker Taylor, FedEx 
senior vice president, stated, local truckers were not structured to 
provide service within FedEx’s normal time frames and the need to 
use a certificated carrier would add two or three days to the delivery 
time for a shipment.161  The alternative was for FedEx and other 
carriers to adopt inefficient mechanisms for transporting packages, 
such as using smaller aircraft and multiple flights instead of serving a 
number of localities out of key cities.162 
FedEx again sought legislative relief. FedEx’s regulatory 
problem did not require full scale trucking deregulation; it was 
sufficient, for FedEx’s immediate purpose, to obtain a legislative 
extension of the ICC terminal exemption that would essentially 
eliminate ICC jurisdiction and provide a complete regulatory 
exemption for all ground transportation shipments that were 
incidental to air transportation.  Full deregulation, however, would 
give FedEx increased flexibility in that FedEx would no longer be 
required to transport all shipments by air.163 
Several other groups joined FedEx in its efforts.  Leading 
business groups, including the National Association of Manufacturers 
and the National Federation of Independent Businesses, supported 
trucking deregulation, arguing that increased competition would 
reduce shipping costs.164  Sears, Roebuck & Company, which relied 
heavily on shipping by truck, pushed for deregulation.165  Small 
trucking firms supported the increased entry that deregulation would 
provide.166  Indeed, the Independent Truckers Association strongly 
supported deregulation.167 
 
 161. See Examining Current Conditions, supra note 155, at 972-76 (statement of S. Tucker 
Taylor) (comparing the time and cost of delivering diagnostic equipment to two hospitals located 
five miles apart and observing that, for the hospital outside the exempt zone, “the incremental 
cost for these last 5 miles is another $12 and another 2 days”). 
 162. See id. at 976-77 (explaining that, but for ICC restrictions, FedEx could reduce the 
number of flights to Pennsylvania while maintaining the same level of service). 
 163. See, e.g., Loving, supra note 109 (describing increased flexibility that trucking 
deregulation would provide to air cargo carriers). 
 164. See Truck Deregulation Bill May be in for a Long Haul in Congress, CHEM. WK., Jan. 31, 
1979, at 20 [hereinafter Long Haul] (describing the support of these “leading business groups”). 
 165. Trucking Deregulation is Moving Fast, BUS. WK., Nov. 27, 1978 at 62 [hereinafter 
Trucking Deregulation is Moving Fast]. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. The Independent Truckers Association represented independent owner-operators.  
See also Carole Shifrin, Backers of Reform Hope Trucking Influence Melting, ATA, Teamsters 
Unhappy, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1980, at D6 (describing support of Sears, independent truckers 
and minority truckers for deregulation). 
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Trucking deregulation was also part of President Carter’s 
economic agenda in the late 1970s.  Carter first proposed substantial 
deregulation at a town meeting in the spring of 1977.168  In late 1977, 
the White House produced an options paper developing a strategy for 
deregulation, but that strategy was never implemented.  Instead, 
trucking deregulation was pushed to the back burner in favor of 
airline deregulation.  In late 1978, a White House task force on 
trucking deregulation prepared a new strategy paper.169  This paper 
too failed to command substantial attention.  Indeed, by May 1979, 
commentators questioned whether legislation was likely, suggesting 
that “the Administration may have missed its chance on trucking 
deregulation.”170 
One reason for the delay was that trucking deregulation was a 
political hot potato.171  Two powerful interest groups opposed trucking 
deregulation: the American Trucking Association and the Teamsters.  
The American Trucking Association was an active opponent of 
deregulation and spent over $1 million, directly and through its 
PAC—the Truck Operator’s Non-Partisan Committee—on political 
activity.172  In addition to spending money, the American Trucking 
Association effectively mobilized its constituency to convey opposition 
to deregulation.173  While the Senate Commerce Committee considered 
the deregulation act, its staff received three hundred calls per day 
from truckers who, in the opinion of one staffer, seemed to be “reading 
from a prepared script.”174  As a committee aide observed, “the ATA is 
an extremely efficient lobbying organization in terms of mail and 
phone calls.”175  The American Trucking Association hired top-level 
 
 168. Lawrence Mosher, Trucking Deregulation – An Idea Whose Time has Almost Gone?, 11 
NAT. J. 817 (May 19, 1979). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. (citing statement by Senate aide “that trucking deregulation faces a far tougher 
political fight than airline deregulation ever did”). 
 172. John P. Frendreis & Richard W. Waterman, PAC Contributions and Legislative 
Behavior: Senate Voting on Trucking Deregulation, 66 SOC. SCI. Q. 401, 404 (1985). Of this 
amount, only $250,000 constituted PAC contributions. Id. The remainder was presumably spent 
on the American Trucking Association’s lobbying and advertising campaigns. 
 173. Mosher cites the response to a Boston public television show debate on trucking 
deregulation in which the ATA mobilized a massive vote in against deregulation as an example 
of the effectiveness of the American Trucking Association’s “political punch.” Mosher, supra note 
168. 
 174. Michael R. Gordon, Deregulation of the Trucking Industry Could be Just Around the 
Corner, 17 NAT. J. 668, Apr. 26, 1980 (describing the American Trucking Association’s lobbying 
efforts). 
 175. Mosher, supra note 168. 
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Washington lobbyists.176  It also reached out to the public, buying 
newspaper and magazine ads in which it warned that trucking 
deregulation would increase the cost of everything from Halloween 
candy to Christmas toys.177  Despite the huge profits enjoyed by the 
industry due to regulation,178 the American Trucking Association was 
able to refocus the debate over continued regulation, arguing that 
deregulation would reduce services to small communities, create 
unemployment and industry chaos, and produce safety problems.179 
The Teamsters, one of the most powerful and politically 
effective interest groups in Washington, also opposed deregulation, 
primarily out of a concern for jobs and wages.180  The Teamsters were 
concerned that deregulation would facilitate the operations of 
nonunion companies, impeding union efforts to organize and 
bargain.181  In response, the Teamsters organized active and bitter 
opposition to trucking deregulation.  Indeed, the Carter 
Administration was so concerned about the Teamsters that it 
attempted to use the issue as a bargaining chip in negotiations with 
the union over its national freight contract.182  The Teamsters’ efforts 
to block deregulation extended beyond lobbying and advertising.  
Former Teamsters president Roy L. Williams was convicted, along 
with four other men, of attempting to bribe Senate Commerce 
Committee Chairman Howard W. Cannon in an effort to stall or block 
trucking deregulation legislation.183 
 
 176. See Trucking Deregulation Gets Caught in a Jam, BUS. WK., Mar. 5, 1979, at 25 
(describing the American Trucking Association’s decision to hire lobbyist Hill & Knowlton, Inc.). 
 177. See Carole M. Shifrin, High Stakes in Trucking Deregulation; Trucking Industry Profits 
Protected by ICC Regulations, WASH. POST., Mar. 5, 1980, at D7 (describing the American 
Trucking Association’s advertising campaigns). 
 178. Id. (describing “handsome profits” enjoyed by the trucking industry). 
 179. See Trucking Deregulation is Moving Fast, supra note 165, at 62 (summarizing the 
American Trucking Association’s arguments against deregulation). 
 180. This opposition appears to have been well founded. The union reportedly “lost more 
than 100,000 trucking-related jobs since the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.” John D. Schulz, 
Deregulation Interests Plan Big Push in Clinton Presidency’s First 100 days, TRAFFIC WORLD, 
Nov. 23, 1992, at 8. 
 181. William Serrin, Teamster Open Convention with Reagan Message, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 
1981, at 7. 
 182. Mosher, supra note 168 (describing Administration official Alfred E. Kahn’s effort to 
trade deregulation concessions for reductions in wage and benefit increases in the Teamsters’ 
contract). 
 183. See Ben A. Franklin, Teamsters’ President and 4 Others Convicted of Plot to Bridge 
Senator, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1982, at A1 (reporting convictions). Although the FBI investigated 
Cannon’s role, that investigation was subsequently dropped by the Justice Department and 
referred to the Senate Ethics Committee. See George Lardner Jr., FBI Is Probing Teamster Link 
To Sen. Cannon; Teamster Link to Cannon Is Subject of FBI Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1980, at 
A1 (describing FB investigation). Charles R. Babcock, Justice Dept. Drops Probe of Cannon; 
Justice Dept. Drops Sen. Cannon Probe; Case referred for Senate Ethics Panel Review, WASH. 
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Trucking deregulation had limited support on Capitol Hill.184 
Many politicians seemed to fear the visible opposition of the American 
Trucking Association and the Teamsters.  This opposition, coupled 
with the absence of an identifiable constituency favoring deregulation, 
resulted in scant legislative support.185  As James Cook explained in 
Forbes magazine, the general public favored airline deregulation, but 
had little interest in trucking.186   
Despite the “controversial” nature of the legislation,187 in July 
1980, Congress enacted and President Carter signed MCA.188  The 
MCA took the initial steps toward deregulation of the trucking 
industry.  The Act “significantly reduced regulatory restrictions on 
entry, gave motor carriers greater pricing flexibility and set 
limitations on collective ratemaking activities.”189  Importantly, the 
MCA reflected a compromise on the scope of deregulation.190  Although 
the Act substantially reduced regulation of interstate trucking, it left 
economic regulation of intrastate trucking to individual states, which 
retained the right to impose entry restrictions and regulate rates.  In 
addition, the MCA empowered the ICC to control the implementation 
of deregulation.191  Although proposals to eliminate the remaining 
 
POST, Dec. 19, 1980, at A1 (reporting termination of Justice Department inquiry). Senator 
Cannon denied any impropriety. Id. 
 184. A notable exception was Senator Kennedy, who sought to organize opposition to the 
truckers and Teamsters by building a coalition of farmers, businesses, and consumers.  Mosher, 
supra note 168. 
 185. Id. (stating that “few politicians on Capitol Hill are clamoring to deregulate the trucking 
industry right now”); Long Haul, supra note 164 (describing limited support for deregulation, 
despite Senator Kennedy’s claims). 
 186. James Cook, Transportation, FORBES, Jan. 8, 1979, at 55. 
 187. See Carole Shifrin, Carter, Kennedy Send Trucking Bill to Congress; Legislation to 
Deregulate Trucking Industry Sent to Hill, WASH. POST, June 22, 1979, at C8 (quoting Senate 
Commerce Committee Chairman Howard D. Cannon’s description of bill); Kathryn L. Moore, 
State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene? 23 J. LEGIS. 171, 190 n.162 (1997) 
(observing that “[t]he hearings on the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 numbered more than 3,600 
pages and filled three separate volumes”). 
 188. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 
U.S.C. (1982)). 
 189. Rene Sacasas & Nicholas A. Glaskowsky, Jr., Motor Carrier Deregulation: A Decade of 
Legal and Economic Conflict, 18 TRANSP. L. J. 189, 210 (1990). 
 190. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Interstate Commerce Commission – Disintegration of an 
American Legal Institution, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1984) (describing the Motor Carrier Act as 
“the culmination of a process of legislative compromise”). Dempsey also observes that the Act 
reflected the adoption of the more conservative House proposal rather than the Senate’s more 
liberal deregulatory effort). Id. 
 191. This result became significant when, after President Reagan succeeded President 
Carter, he replaced the chair of the agency with Reese Taylor, who, according to a report issued 
by the Joint Economic Committee, adopted a policy of reversing the progress toward 
deregulation. Carole Shifrin, Panel Charges ICC Isn’t Deregulating Trucking Industry, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 4, 1982, at D10. 
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federal oversight of interstate trucking were repeatedly considered on 
the Hill,192 complete deregulation of trucking did not occur until 
1995.193 
What factors enabled FedEx and other supporters of 
deregulation to prevail over the opposition of formidable interest 
groups and obtain the adoption of the Motor Carrier Act?  One 
substantial factor may have been that the initial steps to deregulate 
the industry were taken administratively, through actions of the ICC 
under Carter appointee A. Daniel O’Neal.194  The ICC reduced entry 
requirements, expanded unregulated zones, and increased competition 
for return trips.195  The ICC also imposed economic pressure on the 
industry by shifting to a more burdensome standard in its review of 
rate increase requests.196  These actions prompted two influential 
members of the House of Representatives, Harold T. Johnson, chair of 
the House Public Works and Transportation Committee and James J. 
Howard, head of its Surface Transportation Subcommittee, to request 
that the ICC stop its efforts to deregulate in the absence of 
legislation.197 
The ICC’s efforts appear to have played a key part in spurring 
legislative deregulation.  Opponents of deregulation saw a legislative 
compromise as the best way to curtail the ICC’s aggressive 
administrative deregulation.198  The trucking industry believed the 
 
 192. See, e.g., Douglas B. Feaver, Hill Gets Trucking Deregulation Bill; ICC’s Role Would 
End; Consumer Protection Would Be FTC’s Job, WASH POST., Sept. 13, 1985, at A14 (describing 
as “long-delayed” the proposal to end federal oversight of interstate trucking and eliminate the 
ICC delivered to Capitol Hill in Sept. 1985). 
 193. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, Title III, § 337, 109 Stat. 803, 954 
(1995). 
 194. John and Rui de Figueiredo have argued that interest groups may allocate resources 
and coordinate strategies between legislatures, courts and administrative agencies in pursuing 
regulatory change and have modeled the potential interaction between different lawmaking 
institutions. The effect of agency efforts to deregulate on Congress’ decision to adopt deregulatory 
legislation supports their hypothesis and is consistent with their model. See John M.P. de 
Figueiredo & Rui J. de Figueiredo, Jr., The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, 
Litigation and Administrative Regulation, 4 BUS. & POLITICS 161 (2002). 
 195. See Trucking Deregulation is Moving Fast, supra note 165, at 62; Mosher, supra note 
168 (describing the ICC’s deregulatory approach under O’Neal). 
 196. See Mosher, supra note 168 (describing the ICC’s decision to shift to a more restrictive 
methodology for evaluating rate increase requests). 
 197. Long Haul, supra note 164. 
 198. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1069, at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2283, 2285; S. 
REP. NO. 96-641, at 1-2 (1980) (“The bill represents a middle ground between continuing the 
status quo, on the one hand, and total deregulation on the other hand.”); Joseph D. Kearney & 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
1323, 1368 (1998) (describing supporters of continued regulation as acquiescing in the Motor 
Carrier Act, “which they regarded as a kind of backfire designed to keep the reform effort from 
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MCA would achieve this objective.199  Indeed, the American Trucking 
Association itself was responsible for introducing into Congress the 
Motor Carrier Regulatory Improvement Act of 1979, the predecessor of 
the 1980 legislation.200 
These hopes proved to be unfounded.  As a practical matter, 
despite paper limits on its scope, the MCA largely deregulated the 
industry.201  Entry and competition increased dramatically,202 
substantially reducing profits for truckers.203  For the Teamsters, the 
MCA resulted in a loss in membership and a reduction in its power 
due to increased competition by nonunion operations.204 
From FedEx’s perspective, the effects of the MCA were more 
favorable.  The statute contained a provision that provided FedEx 
with precisely the regulatory relief that it had sought initially: a 
specific exemption to federal regulation for motor carrier 
transportation incidental to air transportation.205  Ironically, although 
the MCA, as adopted, reflected the more conservative House approach 
to regulation, the incidental to air exemption was based on the more 
liberal legislation that was proposed in the Senate.206  The provision 
eliminated the geographic limitations imposed by the ICC as well as 
the distinction between exempt pickup and delivery services and line 
haul transportation.  These provisions, which allowed FedEx to use its 
own trucks and eliminated the need to contract with certificated 
carriers, substantially increased FedEx’s ability to expand pickup and 
 
 199. Joan M. Feldman, Clinging to Life . . .; The Interstate Commerce Commission, 
HANDLING & SHIPPING MGMT., Sept. 1983. 
 200. Railroad Deregulation Act of 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface 
Transportation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong. 1005 
(1979) [hereinafter Railroad Deregulation Hearings] (Statement of Jerry Wheeler, South Dakota 
Trucking Assn.). 
 201. Feldman, supra note 199. 
 202. David A. Vise, Truckers Find Deregulation a Rough Road, WASH. POST, July 6, 1982, at 
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 203. Id. 
 204. Id. (explaining how, with the elimination of collective rate setting, nonunion carriers 
with lower labor costs were able to undercut union truckers). 
 205. See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, § 7(b), Pub. L. No. 96-296, 1980 Stat. 2245 (1980) 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10526(a)(8) (“Section 10526(a)(8) of title 49, United States Code 
[providing exemptions from ICC regulation], is amended to read as follows: ‘ . . . (B) 
transportation of property (including baggage) by motor vehicle as  part of a continuous 
movement which, prior or subsequent to such part of  the continuous movement, has been or will 
be transported by an air carrier . . . .’”). 
 206. See Examining Current Conditions, supra note 155, at 1000-01 (statement of Peter E. 
Hubbard, VP, Flying Tiger Line, Inc.) (advocating adoption of incidental to air exemption as 
reflected in Stat. 2245 and proposing specific amendment to House bill). 
  
1526 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:5:1495 
delivery services.207  Thus, despite the mixed results of the process for 
many of the participants, FedEx was largely successful in achieving 
its objectives. 
The history of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 reveals a 
controversial political issue that generated strong interest group 
activity on both sides and that resulted in legislation reflecting a 
political compromise.  It therefore offers an interesting opportunity to 
examine the political process.  Indeed, two scholars, John Frendreis 
and Richard Waterman, have studied the adoption of the MCA, using 
empirical analysis to evaluate the effect of PAC contributions on the 
voting decisions of Senate members by measuring the relationship 
between dollar contributions by the American Trucking Association to 
individual senators and the voting scores of those senators on 
deregulation.208  Frendreis and Waterman found a strong correlation 
between PAC contributions and voting decisions, particularly with 
respect to those senators who were up for re-election in 1980.  They 
concluded these results demonstrated that “legislative votes are 
subject to the influence of campaign contributions,” at least for 
particular kinds of issues, such as trucking deregulation, both because 
of its limited salience  and the fact that it was not strongly associated 
with partisanship or ideology.209 
The analysis in this Article suggests several reasons to 
question both Frendreis and Waterman’s methodology and their 
conclusions.  First, Frendreis and Waterman considered only the PAC 
contributions of the American Trucking Association.  Their rationale 
was that the American Trucking Association was the only 
organization which “[(a)] had a strong interest in the bill; (b) donated 
appreciable amounts of money to many legislators, and (c) did not 
possess a large and diverse legislative agenda.”210  As this Article has 
demonstrated, however, the legislation was highly controversial and 
generated both strong support and opposition by a variety of interest 
groups.  Indeed, the Teamsters thought the issue was sufficiently 
important to attempt to bribe a senator.211  Accordingly, it seems 
 
 207. See Federal Express Rides the Small-Package Boom, BUS. WK., Mar. 31, 1980 
(describing how Smith anticipated that deregulation would enable FedEx to double its 
productivity by introducing specially designed delivery trucks). 
 208. Frendreis & Waterman, supra note 172. 
 209. Id. at 410. 
 210. Id. at 405-06. 
 211. Frendreis and Waterman explain their decision to exclude the Teamsters because of the 
organization’s “extensive legislative agenda.” Id. at 406 n.6. The breadth of the Teamsters’ 
agenda did not, however, reduce their focus on trucking deregulation. Moreover, the magnitude 
of political contributions by the Teamsters dwarfed the American Trucking Association’s PAC 
contributions. See, e.g., Morton Mintz, Election ‘80 was Record Year for PACs, Especially Those 
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necessary, at a minimum, to consider the extent of political 
contributions made by other interest groups.  Even if senators’ votes 
are correlated with PAC contributions, it is hard to see why the 
contributions of a single interest group should be decisive. 
In addition, contrary to the study’s stated conclusion, its 
findings seem to refute the conclusion that money buys votes. Apart 
from the American Trucking Association and the Teamsters, few big 
money donors appear to have focused on deregulation.212  In 
particular, there was a striking absence of powerful, big-money 
support for deregulation.  FedEx was one of the few donors who 
supported deregulation, and its PAC contributions in the 1979-1980 
election cycle totaled approximately $42,000.  Despite the fact that 
big-money opposed deregulation, Congress adopted the Motor Carrier 
Act.  This outcome is difficult to explain in terms of the vote-buying 
model. 
Part of the problem may stem from the fact that the Frendreis 
and Waterman study imperfectly captured the position of the 
American Trucking Association (and other interest groups that 
opposed deregulation) with respect to the MCA.  Although the 
American Trucking Association opposed deregulation, as indicated 
above, it viewed the MCA as a political compromise.  At the time, 
opponents of deregulation considered some type of legislation 
necessary in order to halt the ICC’s progress in implementing 
deregulation administratively.213  Indeed, as mentioned above, the 
American Trucking Association itself was responsible for introducing 
the Motor Carrier Regulatory Improvement Act of 1979, the 
predecessor of the 1980 legislation, into Congress.214  Moreover, the 
1980 legislation, as adopted, reflected the approach of the conservative 
House bill, rather than the more liberal Senate bill that had generated 
most of the American Trucking Association’s opposition.215  
Accordingly, adoption of the MCA cannot fairly be characterized as a 
ratification of the free market position.  In light of the American 
Trucking Association’s support for the predecessor legislation, it is 
 
on Right, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1981, at A4 (describing 1980 PAC expenditures by the Ohio 
branch of the Teamsters alone as totaling $245,368 and listing the AFL-CIO as among the top 10 
PACs in terms of direct contributions to political candidates, with $718,052 in such 
contributions). 
 212. See Mintz, supra note 211 (listing substantial PAC donors in the 1980 election). 
 213. See Gordon, supra note 174, at 668 (explaining that the ATA took “the position that 
compared to the proposed ICC reforms, some sort of limited legislation is the lesser of two evils”). 
 214. Railroad Deregulation Hearings, supra note 200, at 1005 (statement of Jerry Wheeler, 
South Dakota Trucking Assn.). 
 215. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 174, at 668 (explaining that ATA’s opposition was focused 
on the liberal Senate bill which proposed “substantial deregulation”). 
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unclear why American Trucking Association contributions should 
have led to negative votes.216 
Analysis of the Frendreis and Waterman study demonstrates 
that it may be difficult to characterize an interest group’s position on a 
proposed regulatory change for the purposes of empirical analysis, 
particularly when that regulatory change results from a lawmaking 
process that extends over a long period of time.  The difficulty may be 
exacerbated in the case of corporations and other business entities 
because the political objectives of businesses shift over time in 
response to a variety of nonpolitical factors.217 
Additionally, Frendreis and Waterman’s study highlights a 
further, and seemingly unexplored, problem with using empirical 
analysis to assess the impact of political contributions–the weight that 
should be given to a legislator’s dissenting vote on a bill.  Since the 
MCA reflected a legislative compromise that at the time of its 
adoption faced little opposition, it may not be appropriate to 
characterize negative votes as reflecting the political influence of 
interest groups that opposed the legislation.  Seemingly, a legislator 
who predicts that his or her vote will have no effect on the outcome 
could use the voting process as a low cost way to signal receptiveness 
to a targeted interest group, even if the legislator approves of the 
legislation.218  In such a case, a negative vote would provide little 
evidence of the effectiveness of the interest group’s political 
expenditures. 
2.  Intrastate Trucking Deregulation 
After the adoption of the MCA, federal regulation of trucking 
was reduced, increasing rate competition and entry.219  The Motor 
Carrier Act, however, explicitly preserved state authority to regulate 
 
 216. Indeed, although it was unlikely, a vote against the compromise proposal might have 
indicated a senator’s rejection of the watered down form of deregulation reflected in the ATA 
sponsored compromise rather than opposition to deregulation. 
 217. See Hart, supra note 17, at 14 (arguing that, consequently, corporations cannot be 
evaluated according to standard interest group analysis). 
 218. In a similar vein, the House of Representatives recently voted on a constitutional 
amendment banning gay marriage, despite the fact that a previous defeat of the measure by the 
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 219. See, e.g., Legislation to Increase the Efficiency of the Movement of Express Shipments: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the House Comm. on Public Works 
and Transportation, 103rd Cong. (1994) (statement of Frank E. Kruesi, Assist. Sec. for 
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intrastate trucking.220 As a result, state regulation of intrastate 
trucking remained extensive.221  As of 1986, approximately forty states 
continued to regulate intrastate trucking.222  The regulations varied, 
but most included entry controls, tariff filing and rate regulation, 
restrictions on operations, and grants of antitrust immunity for 
carriers to set rates collectively.223 
These numerous and diverse state regulations significantly 
burdened national carriers.  For example, it took UPS almost twenty 
years to obtain authority to operate in Texas.224  Powerful state 
incumbents often impeded the operation of new entrants.225  Many 
states required state approval of rate changes for ground deliveries; as 
a result, rate changes by a national company could be blocked by 
individual states.226  In some cases, regulatory approvals could be held 
up by a single customer.227 
In addition to purely economic regulations,228 states often 
imposed registration and reporting requirements under the guise of 
regulating safety.  The U.S. Department of Transportation estimated 
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the cost of paperwork associated with complying with state 
regulations was somewhere between $1 billion and $3.2 billion per 
year over and above the underlying fees and taxes imposed by the 
states.229  A study commissioned by FedEx estimated that preemption 
of intrastate regulation would have saved the air express industry 
almost $100 million in 1987 alone.230  Carriers typically responded to 
the regulations through interstate routing, which allowed them to 
avoid state regulation, but created unnecessary expense and 
inefficiency.  For example, FedEx could avoid local regulations by 
flying shipments through its air hub in Memphis rather than 
delivering them locally by truck.231 
FedEx appeared to have little interest in intrastate trucking 
deregulation until it became the focus of enforcement efforts by state 
regulators.  Ironically, the first such efforts were made by regulators 
in FedEx’s home state of Tennessee.232  In July 1986, the Tennessee 
Public Service Commission entered a Show Cause Order against 
FedEx, seeking to require FedEx to obtain authorization to operate 
within the state, and, in 1987, the Commission ordered FedEx to 
apply for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity for its Tennessee 
trucking operations.233  FedEx challenged the decision in federal court, 
arguing that, as an air courier, it was exempt from state regulation 
under the Federal Aviation Act.234  The district court thwarted 
FedEx’s efforts to obtain a favorable forum in which to litigate its 
claim of preemption, concluding that it should abstain and allow the 
issue to be litigated in state court.235  The Sixth Circuit affirmed.236 
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Facts revealed in the Tennessee litigation led to an 
investigation by the California Public Utilities Commission 
(“CPUC”).237  Upon learning that FedEx was not complying with 
certain California state licensing requirements, reporting obligations, 
and tariffs, the CPUC imposed fines and threatened penalties.238  
FedEx then filed suit in federal district court in California, claiming 
that the California regulations were preempted by federal law.239  
FedEx challenged the requirement that it pay fees to the state for 
packages transmitted by ground.240  It also claimed that state 
regulations concerning rates, rate changes, refunds, and claims 
procedures imposed an unreasonable burden on its operations.241  
Several aspects of the California regulation directly conflicted with 
FedEx’s national policies.242  For example, FedEx required customers 
to pay their bills within fifteen days,243 whereas California law 
prohibited extending credit to customers for more than one week.  
California regulations also had the effect of making FedEx’s money-
back guarantee an illegal rebate.244 
Although the California district court rejected FedEx’s 
preemption argument, the Ninth Circuit proved receptive.  In 1991, 
FedEx successfully persuaded the court of appeals that the Airline 
Deregulation Act preempted state trucking regulation, even with 
respect to packages shipped solely in intrastate commerce.245  The 
court concluded that the trucking operations of FedEx were integrally 
related to its operation as an air carrier and that the Airline 
Deregulation Act preempted state regulation of rates and terms of 
service by an air carrier.246  In particular, although California 
defended its regulations on the basis that the regulations focused on 
highway safety, the court found that the state regulations were 
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primarily economic in nature: “The PUC’s regulation of rates, of 
discounts and promotional pricing, of claims, of overcharges, of bills of 
lading and freight bills, and its imposition of fees enters the zone that 
Congress has forbidden the states to enter.”247  As a result of the 
Ninth Circuit decision,248 California deregulated “integrated 
intermodal carriers” such as FedEx.249 
Armed with the California decision, FedEx went to Texas, 
which regulated intrastate trucking very restrictively.250  There, 
FedEx negotiated with the executive branch in an effort to avoid the 
protracted litigation that it underwent in California.251  As a carrot to 
enlist the support of Governor Ann Richards, FedEx offered to open a 
major hub in Fort Worth.252  FedEx explicitly linked the hub to 
receiving a ruling from Texas Attorney General Dan Morales that 
FedEx was exempt from Texas trucking regulations.253  FedEx also 
obtained the help of Texas Congressman David Cain in seeking the 
Attorney General’s opinion.254  Smith had an established relationship 
with Cain due to Cain’s position as chairman of the House 
Transportation Committee.  FedEx’s approach was successful, and in 
a letter opinion issued on December 14, 1993, the Attorney General 
ruled that FedEx engaged in integrated air-ground delivery services 
and that these services were exempt from the trucking regulations of 
the Texas Railroad Commission.255  Three days after the decision, 
FedEx announced that it would open a new air hub in Fort Worth.256 
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FedEx obtained similar decisions in other states,257 but the 
process of addressing the state regulations on a piecemeal basis was 
burdensome. Consequently, FedEx, simultaneously, sought 
congressional action.  Its early efforts, despite extensive lobbying, 
were unsuccessful.258  FedEx also attempted to broaden support for 
deregulation.  Smith obtained the support of other air express 
companies in 1987 and sought the aid of shippers by appealing to the 
1,300 member National Industrial Transportation League.259 
One possible reason for FedEx’s lack of success was the 
opposition of UPS, which indicated to Congress that it was able to 
operate successfully under the existing state regulations.260  UPS 
argued that the states had an important interest in regulating 
intrastate trucking activity,261 but it was also clear that UPS’s 
possession of the necessary certifications for intrastate trucking 
provided it with a competitive advantage over FedEx, which  in the 
absence of deregulation, had to go through the burdensome regulatory 
processes to obtain similar certifications.262 
The situation for UPS changed, however, once FedEx obtained 
the favorable Ninth Circuit ruling.  Because UPS had to continue 
conforming to state economic regulations within the Ninth Circuit but 
FedEx did not, it was now UPS that faced a disadvantage.263  Unlike 
FedEx, UPS conducted the majority of its operations by ground, and 
therefore was not classified as an integrated air carrier. Although UPS 
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followed FedEx’s lead by challenging California’s regulations in state 
and federal court, it was unsuccessful.264 
As a result, UPS faced pressure, not just to favor deregulation, 
but to join forces with FedEx.  At the same time, several members of 
Congress suggested that UPS and FedEx get together to resolve their 
differences over the deregulation legislation.265  As a result, after 
several years of disagreement, UPS shifted its position on intrastate 
trucking.  Suddenly, UPS began to describe intrastate trucking 
regulations as burdensome.266  Working together, UPS and FedEx 
developed a jointly acceptable proposal for deregulation, H.R. 3221.267 
Opposition to H.R. 3221 included the Teamsters and the 
American Trucking Association.  The American Trucking Association 
took a somewhat limited role due to conflicts within its membership 
regarding the desirability of deregulation.268  Nonetheless, its official 
policy was to “oppose[] further deregulation of interstate commerce.”269  
Many small and local truckers feared deregulation because it would 
eliminate states’ ability to protect local business from more efficient 
national competition.  The National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissions also expressed this concern, arguing that codification of 
the Ninth Circuit decision would “confer private benefits on the 
intrastate trucking operations of a very few express delivery 
companies” while thousands of smaller trucking companies would still 
have to meet state regulations.270  The Teamsters argued that 
 
 264. See United Parcel Serv, Inc. v. CPUC, 839 F. Supp. 702, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1993) 
(describing UPS’s unsuccessful challenges in state court); id. at 706-708 (denying federal court 
claim based on preclusive effect of state proceeding). 
 265. Regulatory Issues (Intrastate Deregulation; Negotiated Rates; and Overweight 
Containers): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the House Comm. on 
Public Works and Transportation, 102nd Cong. 746 (1992) (testimony of James A. Rogers, VP of 
Public Affairs, UPS) [hereinafter Regulatory Issues Hearings]. 
 266. Legislation to Increase the Efficiency Hearings, supra note 219 (testimony of James A. 
Rogers). 
 267. Regulatory Issues Hearings, supra note 265, at 746 (testimony of James A. Rogers); see 
Robert P. James, High Court Move Seen as Giving FedEx Major Boost in Intrastate Trucking, 
TRAFFIC WORLD, June 15, 1992, at 9 (describing H.R. 3221 as “a UPS/Fedex-backed bill”). H.R. 
3221, sponsored by Rep. Bob Clement, D-Tenn. would have preempted state regulation for 
express carriers like Federal Express and United Parcel Service. Along with H.R. 3221, several 
competing proposals were introduced. See John D. Schulz, Bush Administration Weighs in on 
Latest Push for Truck Deregulation, TRAFFIC WORLD, Apr. 6, 1992, at 21 (noting that at least six 
bills concerning trucking deregulation were pending in Congress). Rep. J. Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., 
introduced legislation supported by the administration to lift state economic regulation of all 
trucking services. At the same time, Rep. Peter A. DeFazio, D-Ore., offered legislation to 
overturn the Ninth Circuit decision and preserve state authority to regulate intrastate transport. 
 268. Schulz, supra note 267, at 21. 
 269. Id. (quoting ATA President Thomas J. Donohue). 
 270. Williams, supra note 220, at 326-27. 
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deregulation would eliminate union jobs.271  Finally, the states 
themselves opposed deregulation as an unwarranted congressional 
intrusion into a matter of local concern.272 
Although the congressional climate appeared to support some 
form of deregulation, it was unclear whether deregulation should be 
narrowly tailored to the express carriers or addressed to all state 
economic trucking regulations.  In addition, the political controversy 
was too much of an obstacle for passage in an election year.273  H.R. 
3221 died at the end of the 102nd Congress.274 
UPS then obtained the support of Senator Wendell Ford of 
Kentucky, who headed the Senate Aviation Subcommittee.275  In 1994, 
Ford added a provision to the Aviation Authorization Bill, a FAA 
funding statute, that explicitly preempted state regulation.276  
Originally, the bill was limited to express carriers, but, when trucking 
operators objected, Ford expanded the bill.  Eventually, the bill was 
extended to exempt virtually all trucking operations from state 
economic regulation.277  On August 23, 1994, after approximately 
fifteen years, trucking deregulation was finally achieved, through a 
provision inserted into the Federal Aviation Administration Act of 
1994, an airport funding law, and passed by Congress by voice vote 
without dissent or public hearings.278  The legislation broadly 
preempted state regulation of intrastate trucking through two 
separate provisions: 49 U.S.C. 41713(b), which barred states from 
regulating prices, routes, or service of air carriers “when such carrier 
is transporting property by aircraft or by motor vehicle”; and 49 U.S.C. 
 
 271. See James W. Brosnan, Shift is on to Lift Trucking Rules, COM. APPEAL, July 21, 1994, 
at 4B (describing the “staunchest opposition” to deregulation as coming from the Teamsters). 
 272. See, e.g., Legislation to Increase the Efficiency Hearings, supra note 219 (testimony of 
Keith Bissell, Tennessee Public Service Comm’n on behalf of the National Ass’n of Regulatory 
Utility Comm’rs). 
 273. Schulz, supra note 267, at 21. 
 274. See Legislation to Increase the Efficiency Hearings, supra note 219 (testimony of James 
A. Rogers, VP Government Affairs, UPS) (explaining that, although HR 3221 had 190 co-
sponsors, it had died at the end of the prior Congress); Senate Panel Pushes Higher FAA 
Funding, Some Denver Funding, 297 AV. DAILY 463 (1989) (recounting the adoption of an 
amendment sponsored by John Sasser “to require DOT to study the effect on consumers of state 
regulation of the rates, routes and services of the express package industry” and describing 
amendment as favoring FedEx “which seeks federal regulation of intrastate trucking”). 
 275. UPS maintained a large hub in Lousville, Kentucky. Brosnan, supra note 271. 
 276. Id. 
 277. James W. Brosnan & Richard Locker, PSC Halts Reviews After Passage of Trucking 
Bill, COM. APPEAL, Aug. 17, 1994 at 4B. 
 278. Charles T. Jones, U.S. Judge to Decide Truck Case, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 28, 1994, 
at 15. The bill took effect on Jan. 1, 1995. Kelley  v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 
1995). 
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11501(h), which barred states from imposing such regulations on any 
motor carrier other than an air carrier.279 
As the foregoing discussion reveals, several factors contributed 
to FedEx’s eventual success.  By simultaneously pursuing litigation 
and legislation, FedEx was able to obtain a favorable judicial ruling 
that enabled it to exert pressure both on Congress to act and on UPS 
to support deregulation.280  FedEx’s coalition-building was also a 
factor.  FedEx started with the air carriers, then enlisted the support 
of the shippers, and eventually persuaded UPS to add its support.281  
Finally, even the American Trucking Association dropped its 
opposition.282  FedEx built these coalitions by supporting the broadest 
possible deregulation rather than attempting to maintain the narrow 
competitive advantage that it obtained by virtue of the Ninth Circuit 
ruling.283 
It is important to note that trucking deregulation, even at the 
very end, occurred as a byproduct of a concerted legislative effort to 
provide relief from state trucking regulation for air carriers.  
Ultimately, FedEx’s efforts were central, and its influence is reflected 
in the legislative history.  In addition to extensive testimony by FedEx 
officials, FedEx repeatedly supplied detailed information supporting 
its claims that state trucking regulation was inefficient.284 Thus, 
FedEx armed members of Congress with the necessary information to 
justify deregulation as serving the interests of consumers and 
shippers.285  FedEx also traded on its professional reputation to 
generate legislative support.  In a key hearing, Smith used the 
 
 279. Notably, even at this point, the states and the Teamsters did not concede defeat. Five 
states and the Teamsters challenged the constitutionality of the legislation in federal court. The 
Tenth Circuit upheld the legislation in Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503 (10th Cir. 1995), 
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 517 U.S. 1166 (1996). 
 280. See de Figueiredo & de Figueiredo, supra note 194 (using game theory to model 
litigation and lobbying as independent activities in multi-stage interest group strategy). 
 281. Significantly, when UPS joined the deregulatory effort, it brought some union 
representatives on board, significantly weakening the effectiveness of the continued Teamsters 
opposition. Hill Interview V, Apr. 15, 2002, supra note 28. 
 282. Mitchell E. MacDonald, Federal Government Cans Intrastate Motor Carrier Regulation, 
33 TRAFFIC MGMT. 17, (1994). 
 283. See, e.g., Rip Watson, Carrier Interests Spar as Hearings Approach, J. COM., July 12, 
1994, at 3B (quoting FedEx VP Doyle Cloud as stating “We support the broadest possible 
removal of state regulation”). 
 284. See, e.g., Regulatory Issues Hearings, supra note 265, at 1136 (statement of Frederick 
W. Smith) (detailing the cost savings expected to be achieved through deregulation as 
demonstrated by five different studies). FedEx itself commissioned one such study. Id.   
 285. See Hirschman, supra note 49, at 1C (quoting David Traynham, a staff member on the 
House Aviation Subcommittee, as explaining that the ability of FedEx and UPS to convey 
information to Congress about the effect of trucking deregulation was a key issue in the success 
of the legislation). 
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example of FedEx’s actions in arranging a special flight to deliver 
drilling equipment to help save Baby Jessica to explain to members of 
the committee the importance of express freight.286 
FedEx also made use of its extensive political relationships.  
Tennessee Congressman Bob Clement sponsored H.R. 3321—the bill 
that seemingly generated the greatest momentum for deregulation.  In 
the Senate, Tennessee Senator Jim Sasser, whose re-election 
campaign was run by Smith, 287 co-sponsored the legislation that 
eventually passed.288  Moreover, by the early 1990s, FedEx had built a 
reputation for itself in Congress.  Members of the House Committee 
were well acquainted with Smith; during the hearings, several made 
reference to his earlier appearances in connection with such issues as 
air cargo deregulation.289 
Was money a factor in FedEx’s success?  FedEx’s political 
donations were substantial and well publicized by the mid 1990s.290  
Moreover, FedEx donated money to many of the key players in 
trucking deregulation,291 including Rep. Bob Clement292 and House 
subcommittee chairman Norman Mineta,293 who reportedly played an 
instrumental role in securing passage of the legislation at the 
conference committee stage.294  Nonetheless, FedEx’s contributions do 
not appear to have been out of line for the industry.295  As one 
commentator noted, in analyzing the role of FedEx’s political 
expenditures in connection with trucking deregulation, “despite the 
 
 286. Regulatory Issues Hearings, supra note 265, at 738 (testimony of Frederick W. Smith).  
See also supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing Baby Jessica incident). 
 287. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 288. Dave Hirschman, FedEx, UPS Push for End to Intrastate Regulations, COM. APPEAL, 
May 8, 1994, at 1C. 
 289. See, e.g., Regulatory Issues Hearings, supra note 265, at 739 (statement of Rep. 
Hammerschmidt, Member Subcomm. on Surface Transportation). 
 290. Hirschman, supra note 49 (observing that FedEx and UPS together donated more 
money to politicians in the 1991-92 election cycle than all the passenger airlines combined but 
explaining that “political spending at FedEx has remained relatively constant in the last four 
years”). 
 291. Half the members of the House Subcommittee on Surface Transportation received 
political donations from FedEx. Roland Klose, Fed Ex Visits PAC Friends in Congress, COM. 
APPEAL, Apr. 1, 1992, at B3. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Mineta sponsored H.R. 3321.  Id. 
 294. See MacDonald, supra note 282 (describing the importance of Mineta’s efforts in 
obtaining the Senate’s agreement to broad deregulatory legislation). 
 295. See Klose, supra note 291 (observing that “the air express company appears to have only 
managed to keep pace with other transportation interests seeking to influence federal policy”). In 
analyzing competing interest groups with respect to trucking deregulation, Klose noted that 
although FedEx was the tenth largest contributor to members of the House Public Works 
Committee in 1987-1988, the Airline Pilots Association and the Teamsters together contributed 
more than seven times as much. Competitor UPS was the third largest contributor. 
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size of  Federal Express’s contributions to the key transportation 
policymakers in the House, its giving has been substantially less than 
other special interests, including two large labor groups and air 
express competitor United Parcel Service.”296  In particular, the 
Teamsters—the interest group that remained most strongly opposed 
to trucking deregulation—contributed more than $5 million to political 
candidates in 1993  and the first nine months of 1994.297  Accordingly, 
the story of trucking deregulation does not appear to be strongly 
consistent with the vote buying hypothesis.  More generally, trucking 
deregulation suggests that the traditional story of interest group 
competition in politics offers an incomplete explanation as to why one 
interest group is successful in prevailing over a competing group.298 
C.  Unionization and the FAA Rider 
FedEx entered the cargo transportation industry as an air 
carrier rather than a ground carrier.  As a result, it was covered by 
airline regulations, including the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”).299  
FedEx took advantage of its status as an air carrier for purposes of 
labor regulations.  Early on in its history, FedEx successfully 
established that because it was subject to the RLA, it was exempt 
from the National Labor Relations Act300—which covers employees at 
most other shipping companies, including UPS.301 
The significance of FedEx’s air carrier status is threefold.  
First, FedEx labor disputes are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
National Mediation Board (“NMB”) rather than the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”).  Second, the rules governing strikes and 
work stoppages under the RLA are much less favorable to labor.302  
 
 296. Id. 
 297. Hirschman, supra note 49. 
 298. Indeed, it is worthy of note that, in the midst of the battle to deregulate trucking, 
Teamsters’ lobbyists were reportedly successful in persuading House and Senate Democratic 
congressional campaign committees to stop using the services of Federal Express. Roland Klose, 
Lawmaker Supports Exemption for FedEx, COM. APPEAL, July 31, 1991, at B4. 
 299. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (2005). 
 300. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (2005). 
 301. See, e.g., Adams v.  Fed. Express Corp., 547 F.2d 319, 320 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that 
Federal Express is subject to the RLA); id. at 324 (appending In re Representation of Employees 
of Fed. Express Corp., National Mediation Board Case No. R-4564, Jan. 13, 1976 (finding that 
FedEx and its mechanics constitute an air carrier and employees within the meaning of the 
RLA)); Fed. Express Corp., 6 N.M.B. No. 1032 (1978) (holding that FedEx truck drivers were 
subject to NMB jurisdiction under FLA). 
 302. As one commentator explained: 
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Third, and most important, under the RLA, unions must organize a 
company’s employees nationally rather than locally;303  this 
requirement makes it substantially more difficult to unionize.  As a 
result, despite continued union attempts to organize FedEx 
employees,304 only the pilots succeeded in unionizing.305  The ability to 
avoid union constraints in dealing with its workers was a cost-saving 
measure for FedEx and “a key element of Federal Express’ market 
strategy.”306 
FedEx secured its coverage under the RLA through a series of 
judicial and administrative agency decisions.307  Again, a key 
component of FedEx’s success was demonstrating that its nonairline 
employees were engaged in work that was an integral part of its air 
carrier operations.308 Importantly, FedEx faced repeated opposition 
from the Teamsters and other unions, which challenged FedEx’s 
status under the RLA.  Indeed, the Teamsters sought to use trucking 
deregulation as a tool to eliminate FedEx’s favored status under the 
 
Under the RLA, unions may strike only over “major” issues, and must follow 
an arduous course of mediation before they legally can do so. They may not 
strike at all over minor issues, which must be arbitrated. Under the NLRA, a 
company can be struck at one terminal, but not others. Strictly local disputes 
can escalate into work stoppages, and there is no legal distinction between 
major and minor disputes. Thus, they’re all major.  
 
Larry Kaufman, Inside Talk - Larry Kaufman UPS Wants to See a Level Playing Field on the 
Labor Front, J. Com., June 30, 1993, at 2B. 
 303. See, e.g., Chicago Truck Drivers v. National Mediation Bd., 670 F.2d 665, 665-66 (7th 
Cir. 1981) (explaining that, pursuant to the RLA, the union must seek certification as to entire 
craft or class of FedEx employees); Chris Isidore, FedEx Pilots Accept Collective Bargaining, 
J.COM. , Feb. 8, 1999, at 14A (explaining that, because FedEx is covered by the RLA, “organizing 
must be done on a company-wide basis within each job classification, rather than location by 
location as at other companies”). 
 304. See, e.g., Adams v. Fed. Express Corp., 547 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1976) (describing 
unsuccessful efforts by Teamsters to organize FedEx mechanics in the mid 1970s); Chicago 
Truck Drivers v. National Mediation Board, 670 F.2d 665, 666 (7th Cir. 1981) (describing 
unsuccessful attempts by Chicago Truck Drivers Union to represent local FedEx truck drivers). 
 305. FedEx pilots did not succeed in unionizing until 1993, after several unsuccessful votes.  
See Dane Hamilton, Teamsters to Start a Drive for FedEx Ground Workers, J. COM., Mar. 8. 
1993, at 1A (reporting successful unionization vote by pilots in January 1993); Mark B. Solomon, 
Federal Dodges Labor’s Bullet, but More may be in Chamber, Pilot’s Union may seek Rerun 
Election, J. COM., Aug. 26, 1991, at 3B (describing unsuccessful unionization efforts). 
 306. David P. Baron, Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and 
Executive Institutions, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 47, 50 (2001). 
 307. See, supra note 301 (citing cases); see also Chicago Truck Drivers, 670 F.2d at 665 
(holding that FedEx truck drivers were not subject to the NLRA); Fed. Express Corp., 23 N.M.B. 
32 (1995) (holding that all FedEx employees, not just pilots, etc., are subject to RLA and 
therefore not subject to NLRB jurisdiction). 
 308. See, e.g., Chicago Truck Drivers, 670 F.2d at 666 (concluding that FedEx trucking 
operations were “an integral part of the Employer’s air carrier operations”). 
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RLA.309  Litigation offered FedEx a mechanism by which to secure its 
status that was partially shielded from labor’s substantial political 
strength. 
In the early 1990s, the differential treatment for FedEx and 
UPS was challenged.  The United Auto Workers sought to organize 
FedEx ground employees under the NLRA, arguing that changes in 
FedEx’s intermodal transportation increased the importance of its 
trucking services, an area that traditionally was not covered by the 
RLA.310  At the same time, UPS attempted to free itself from NLRB 
regulation, arguing that it too should be governed by the RLA and the 
NMB.311  The NLRB heard oral arguments in both cases together and 
concluded that different regulatory treatment continued to be 
warranted.  With respect to FedEx, the NLRB concluded that it had 
“never asserted jurisdiction over Federal Express” and that FedEx 
“has been a carrier under the RLA since at least the mid 1970s.”312  In 
contrast, the NLRB observed that it had exercised jurisdiction over 
UPS for at least  forty-seven years, that UPS continued to transport 
over 90% of its shipments by ground, and that UPS’s ground 
transportation was not sufficiently related to its air operations to 
remove it from NLRA coverage.313  The D.C. Circuit affirmed NLRB’s 
decision, explaining that a key distinction between UPS and FedEx 
was the complete dependence of FedEx’s trucking operations on its 
air-freight services.314 
UPS vowed to take the issue to Congress in order to obtain 
equal treatment.315  Before it could do so, however, in 1995, as part of 
the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination 
Act, Congress removed the “express company” classification from the 
 
 309. Klose, supra note 291, at B4. 
 310. See Fed. Express Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1155 (July 21, 1995) (describing procedural 
history of litigation); dissenting opinion of William B. Gould IV, 317 N.L.R.B. 1155, 1158 
(describing claimed change in the nature of FedEx’s operations). 
 311. United Parcel Serv. Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 92 F.3d 1221, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 
1996). 
 312. Fed. Express Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. at 1156. 
 313. See United Parcel Serv. Inc., 92 F.3d at 1222 (summarizing the NLRB’s findings); 
United Parcel Serv. Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 778, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 878, *21-26 (Aug. 25, 1995) 
(rejecting UPS’s argument that it is an “express company” under the RLA and therefore not an 
employer under section 2(2) of the NLRA). 
 314. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 92 F.3d at 1228 (DC Cir. 1996) (finding it “abundantly clear 
that FedEx’s trucking services, unlike UPS, Inc., do principally serve FedEx’s air-delivery 
services”). 
 315. Chris Isidore, UPS, FedEx may be Subject to Different Labor Laws, J. COM., Sept. 11, 
1995, at 2B. 
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RLA.316  FedEx had relied on this language to argue that all of its 
operations, not just its airline operations, were subject to the RLA.  By 
most accounts, the removal of the language appears to have been a 
technical error;317 there is no legislative history offering any 
affirmative reason for eliminating the classification.318  Nonetheless, 
the change created a potential ambiguity in FedEx’s status.  
Importantly, the change gave the unions new ammunition in their 
attempt to subject FedEx to the NLRA.319 
FedEx sought corrective legislation.  Powerful opposition from 
unions and UPS as well as charges of special interest legislation made 
direct efforts to overturn the change unlikely to succeed.  Democrats 
sympathetic to labor vowed to fight the provision and warned of a 
possible White House veto.320  Nonetheless, FedEx’s political allies 
persevered in their efforts to reinstate RLA coverage for express 
companies.  Indeed, legislators tried to attach riders to some six 
separate bills without getting the provision adopted.321  In each case, 
 
 316. William Roberts, FedEx Gets its Way in Aviation Legislation, J. COM., Sept. 27, 1996, at 
1A. 
 317. See, e.g., Richard E. Cohen, The Democrats Express Themselves, 28 CONG. CHRON. 2185 
(Oct. 12, 1996) (stating that “Members and aides who worked on the 1995 legislation said that 
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Robber Barons, J. COM.,  Oct. 7, 1996, at 8A (“In fact, the nonpartisan Congressional Research 
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Express, Unions Fight over two Little Words in Bill, WASH. TIMES, July 29, 1996, at A8 
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 318. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H11, 457-58 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Molinari)  (explaining removal of “Express Company” term as based on assumption that the term 
was obsolete and failure to realize significance of term for NMB purposes); 142 CONG. REC. S11, 
941 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Senator McCain) (stating that it was clear to all 
conferees that the elimination of the express company language reflected “a mistake in the 
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 319. See William Roberts, Loss of Two Words Stirs Fears at FedEx, J.COM., June 10, 1996, at 
1A (summarizing union argument and significance of the change for pending NLRB ruling). 
Significantly, however, other language in the Termination Act provided that abolishing the ICC 
did not “‘expand nor contract coverage of the employees and employers by the Railway Labor 
Act.” James W. Brosnan, Dropped Term in Law Raises Union Ire at FedEx, COM. APPEAL, June 
12, 1996, at 4B. 
 320. William Roberts, Organized Labor set to Fight GOP on FedEx Rider, J. COM., May 20, 
1996, at 1B. 
 321. See, e.g., Mike Dorning & Mary Jacoby, Simon Knows how to Play the Game in Senate, 
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1996, at C2  (quoting Rep. Bill Lipinski of Chicago, the ranking Democrat on 
the House Aviation Subcommittee as stating that FedEx had unsuccessfully tried to attach the 
provision to six bills in the past nine months).  For example, Senator Hollings offered the 
provision at an Appropriations Committee mark-up of a transportation spending bill; the 
amendment was subsequently rejected by the committee.   Sands, supra note 317, at A8.  
Congressman Shuster attached an amendment as a last minute addition to the 1996 Railroad 
Unemployment Insurance Amendments Act, that would have restored the definition of “express 
company” to the RLA.  Roberts, supra  note 320, at 1B.  When it became clear that the 
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supporters of the amendment characterized it as a technical 
correction, while opponents challenged the measure as special interest 
legislation.322  
Eventually, Senator Hollings reintroduced the provision as a 
rider to the FAA authorization bill in conference committee.323  The 
FAA authorization bill, which enjoyed extensive support apart from 
the FedEx provision, was to reauthorize the FAA and to approve 
various airport security measures.324  Despite the fact that neither the 
Senate nor the House versions of the bill contained the provision, the 
conference committee approved it–House Republicans joining with a 
unanimous group of five Senate conferees, Democrat and Republican–
by an 8-2 vote.325  The media quoted Rep. Bud Shuster, R-Pa., 
chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, 
as saying, “I have been instructed by my leadership to accept this.”326 
The conference bill then went back to the House, where it was 
passed, substantially along party lines.  Significantly, when the House 
Parliamentarian ruled that the FedEx rider constituted a substantive 
amendment that was arguably beyond the scope of the Conference 
Committee’s authority, the House waived any such objections to the 
bill.327 
When the measure went to the Senate floor for final passage, 
Senator Kennedy led an effort to block the legislation through a 
filibuster.328  Although the filibuster threatened to prevent Congress 
from adjourning,329 after four days of debate, FedEx was able to obtain 
enough votes to invoke cloture by an ample 66 to 31 margin.330  House 
Democrats raised yet another objection, arguing that the Conference 
 
amendment faced too much opposition from House Democrats, it was withdrawn from the bill.  
William Roberts & Chris Isidore, House GOP Pull Labor Law Amendment Sought by Federal 
Express Corp., J. COM., May 22, 1996, at 1B. 
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 325. Roberts, supra note 320. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Thirty Republicans voted in opposition to the measure; fifteen Democrats voted in favor.  
142 CONG. REC. S12, 179 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Senator Kennedy). 
 328. FAA Reauthorization, Facts on File, WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Oct. 10, 1996, at 740 
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in the Political Skies, supra note 324, at 6. 
 329. See Cohen, supra note 317 (summarizing the political battle over adoption of the 
provision). 
 330. Lee E. Helfrich, Playing Games in the Senate: We all Lose when the Republican Majority 
Fiddles with Parliamentary Rules to Thwart Democracy, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, at 68. 
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Report exceeded the scope of the committee’s authority.  When the 
Chair upheld this position, the Senate voted to overturn the Chair’s 
ruling.331  The bill then passed by the overwhelming margin of 92 to 2, 
definitively establishing the status of FedEx workers as aviation 
employees.332 
FedEx pulled out all the stops in its effort to obtain the 
legislative change.  The company’s effort to generate political support 
included substantial political expenditures. 
 
 
 
1995-96 Soft Money Contributions 973,000 333 
1995-96 PAC Expenditures 943,000334 
Lobbying Expenditures - 1/1/96-6/30/96 1,149,150335 
 
FedEx hired nine Washington lobbying firms in the first six 
months of 1996, and its PAC made donations totaling over $800,000 to 
more than 224 candidates for the House and Senate in the 1993-94 
election cycle,336 in addition to the company’s soft money donations 
and other attempts to obtain congressional allies.337  Yet this strategy 
entailed a certain amount of risk.  Unlike most of its other political 
initiatives, the FAA rider was impossible to defend as anything other 
than special interest legislation.  Further, FedEx’s substantial 
political contributions allowed opponents of the legislation to argue 
that support for the rider was motivated by the contributions, rather 
than the merits.338 
There are reasons, however, to question the causal relationship 
between these expenditures and FedEx’s success.  First, it is 
important to note the process that was employed to restore the 
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Republicans to defeat the filibuster. See David Rogers, Unions and FedEx Spar on Capitol Hill 
Meanwhile Senators Vote To End State Review Of Mutual-Fund Sector, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1996, 
at A3 (describing FedEx’s support from Southern Democrats). 
 333.  Nancy Watzman et al., Two New Ways to Look at Global Connections to U.S. Politics, in 
OPENSECRETS.ORG MONEY IN POLITICS ALERT (May 19, 1997), available at 
http://www.opensecrets.org/alerts/v3/ALRTV3N16.asp. 
 334. THE ALMANAC OF FEDERAL PACS 2000-2001, at 92 (Edward Zuckerman ed., 2000). 
 335. Lewis, supra note 18, at 37. 
 336. See id. (explaining that a corporation typically hires a lobbying firm because of its 
relationship with specific lawmakers). 
 337. Id. (describing various FedEx efforts to gain influence with lawmakers). 
 338. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H11, 458 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Rep. Nadler) 
(describing FedEx as “a large source of campaign contributions for lots of people”). 
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“express company” designation.  FedEx’s allies did not seek to make 
the change through stand-alone legislation, which would have entailed 
a traditional vote on the measure.  Instead, from the beginning, they 
chose to attach the change as a rider to another bill that was 
uncontroversial and likely to pass.  The eventual attachment of the 
rider to the FAA reauthorization bill occurred during the Conference 
Committee.  Accordingly, one key issue was obtaining a legislative 
committee that was willing to approve the rider.  The Conference 
Committee was comprised of legislators who had previously 
established relationships with FedEx, including: Tennessee 
Congressman John Duncan, the head of the Aviation Subcommittee; 
Congressman Bud Shuster; Senator Wendall Ford; and Senator Fritz 
Hollings.339  Both Shuster and Ford had worked closely with FedEx on 
trucking deregulation. 
Significantly, at least in the first instance, the procedure 
employed required substantial efforts by a few key legislators to 
introduce the FedEx rider and to accept the resulting political 
fallout.340  It seems unlikely that a corporation could obtain this type 
of support for a $5,000 political contribution.341  Rather, FedEx’s 
relationships with the dominant legislators appear to have been far 
more important.342  In particular, FedEx had the support of Senator 
Hollings, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Commerce, Science and 
Transportation Committee, and chief sponsor and proponent of the 
amendment.343  Senator Holling’s support was not purchased through 
campaign contributions; Hollings received no substantial political 
contributions from FedEx or Smith prior to 1996.344  Rather, FedEx 
 
 339. See Rogers, supra note 332, at A3 (describing Hollings’ and Ford’s support for FedEx). 
 340. See Hill Interview III, Apr. 12, 2002, supra note 28 (observing “how much trouble a lot 
of senators were willing to go through” to support FedEx’s position). 
 341. The maximum permissible contribution by a PAC to an individual congressional 
candidate is $5,000. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(2)(A) (2005). 
 342. Significantly, these relationships were not exclusively tailored to the FAA rider. 
Instead, FedEx had, over a period of time, cultivated relationships with legislators that served on 
the congressional committees with jurisdiction over FedEx’s operations. See, e.g., Frank N. 
Wilner, Up Close and Ugly, TRAFFIC WORLD, Oct. 16, 2000, at 12 (describing FedEx’s attempts to 
build a relationship with Bud Shuster while “FedEx was lobbying Congress on bilateral aviation 
relations with Japan.”). See also Rogers, supra note 332, at A3 (describing FedEx’s relationships 
with several key Senate Democrats who supported the legislation, including Senator Bennett 
Johnston, who was described as Fred Smith’s tennis partner). 
 343. Cohen, supra note 317. For a discussion of the importance of bill sponsorship in raising 
the saliency of a policy issue see Wendy Schiller, Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill 
Sponsorship to Shape Legislative Agendas, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 186 (1995). 
 344. FedEx Become Big Hollings Contributor, THE BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, July 8, 1998 
(reporting that, prior to battle over the 1996 rider, Hollings had received no substantial 
contributions from FedEx). Subsequently, however, FedEx and its executives became the top 
donors to Hollings’s 1998 reelection campaign. Id. 
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earned the loyalty of Senator Hollings a decade earlier by donating its 
aircraft to fly hay to his state during the 1986 droughts.345  Senator 
Hollings openly acknowledged that his introduction of the FAA rider 
was based on his gratitude to FedEx for the haylifts as well as the 
company’s track record as a good corporate citizen.346 
Similarly, FedEx had cultivated the loyalty and support of Bud 
Shuster, author of the Conference Committee Report, prior to the FAA 
rider.347  FedEx employed the services of Shuster’s former chief of 
staff, lobbyist Ann Eppard, in connection with the rider.348  FedEx also 
regularly provided Shuster with a private aircraft for his exclusive 
use.349  In addition to his effort on FedEx’s behalf in the House and on 
the Conference Committee, Shuster wrote a letter to the Senate, 
justifying the FedEx rider as necessary to correct a technical error.350 
As indicated above, FedEx’s reputation was a key factor in its 
success.  For example, when Senator Kennedy attempted to degrade 
FedEx in an effort to block the rider, other legislators were able to 
respond by pointing to FedEx’s recognition as one of the “100 Best 
Companies to Work for in America.”351  Senator Hollings explicitly 
referenced the fact that former senators from both parties, Senators 
Baker and Mitchell, were currently FedEx Board members.352  Senator 
Tanner criticized attacks on the company by pointing to FedEx’s 
contributions to the Civil Patrol and to Operation Desert Storm.353 
Moreover, focusing on the closeness of the vote to end the 
Senate filibuster354 overlooks the significance of the strategy employed 
by FedEx’s allies.  After the House approved the FAA Reauthorization 
bill, with the FedEx rider attached, it adjourned.  At this point, the 
 
 345. Cohen, supra note 317, at 2185. 
 346. Lewis, supra note 18, at 37; see also Dave Williams, Hollings Wins Provision to Help 
Federal Express, STATE NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 3, 1996. 
 347. Federal Aviation Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213 (1996).  
 348. William Roberts, Republican Strategy for FedEx Falls Flat, Organized Labor, Democrats 
Unite to Oppose Special Provision, J. COM., May 29, 1996, at A1; Wilner, supra note 342, at 12. 
 349. See Wilner, supra note 342, at 12 (stating that FedEx provided aircraft for Shuster on 
six separate occasions in 1995, and quoting a FedEx official as stating “[w]e generally tried to do 
any trip that Mr. Shuster wanted to do”). 
 350. 142 CONG. REC. S12, 175-76 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1976) (letter from Bud Shuster and Susan 
Molinari to Trent Lott dated July 12, 1996). 
 351. See 142 CONG. REC S12, 173 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996 ) (statement of Senator Hollings) 
(citing ROBERT LEVERING & MILTON MOSKOWITZ, THE 100 BEST COMPANIES TO WORK FOR IN 
AMERICA 121-26 (1993)). 
 352. 142 CONG. REC S12, 185 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Senator Hollings). 
 353. 142 CONG. REC H11, 460 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Rep. Tanner). 
Congressman Tanner also observed that Fred Smith was a Vietnam veteran who “crawled 
through the rice paddies.” Id. 
 354. See Baron, supra note 306, at 50 (highlighting FedEx’s need to obtain 60 votes to invoke 
closure as “the focus of its nonmarket strategy”). 
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fate of the FedEx rider was largely predetermined.  The Senate was 
faced with the choice between voting down the bill, which would have 
had the effect of allowing the FAA’s funding to expire and greatly 
jeopardizing air travel, or approving the bill in its existing form.  If the 
Senate had attempted to approve a modified version of the bill without 
the FAA rider, the bill would have had to go back to the House for 
approval,  requiring the House either to return to Washington or  to 
approve the bill by unanimous consent – neither of which were 
realistic options.  As a result, the filibuster debate and vote were more 
a matter of political posturing than a meaningful indication of the 
legislators’ substantive positions on the rider. 
Indeed, understanding the political context of the cloture vote 
is important. Although the votes supporting FedEx may not have been 
purchased through political donations, the Teamsters’ donations, in 
contrast, may have purchased favorable, though ineffective, votes.  
Notably, the FedEx rider was most strongly opposed by the pro-labor 
Democrats.  Unlike FedEx, which at the time donated substantial 
amounts of money to both political parties,355 the Teamsters’ more 
substantial donations were targeted at Democrat allies–precisely 
those allies who voted against cloture.356  According to the Federal 
Election Commission, the Teamsters’ PAC, known as the Democratic 
Republican Independent Voter Education Fund, was the top 
contributor to congressional campaigns in the 1995-96 election 
cycle.357  Perhaps more significantly, the Teamsters were not reticent 
about the expectations that they attached to their political 
contributions.  After they failed to prevail on the FedEx rider, 
 
 355. Robert D. Novak, Smith Splits the Ranks, COM. APPEAL, Oct. 18, 1996, at A6. 
 356. See Ruth Marcus, Labor Spent $119 Million For ‘96 Politics, Study Says; Almost All 
Contributions Went to Democrats, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1997, at A19 (reporting that “[t]he top 
union PAC giver [in the 1996 election cycle] was the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
which made $ 2.6 million in PAC contributions, all but $ 106,000 to  Democrats”). Labor 
contributions had also become an increasingly important component of the Democrats’ political 
funding. See William Schneider, Big Labor’s Crushing Embrace, NAT. J., Nov. 29, 1997 (reporting 
that by 1996, labor PACs accounted for almost half of the PAC contributions to Democratic 
congressional candidates). 
 357. David Barnes, Will White House Intervene in Teamsters UPS Strike?, J. COM., Aug. 11, 
1997, at 12. See also James W. Brosnan & Anna Davis, Lott Gripes Despite Party’s Slice of 
Business PAC Pie, GOP gets Two-Thirds of Funds from Memphis Firms, COM. APPEAL, Dec. 27, 
1996, 1A. 
The FedEx PAC dwarfs all others in Tennessee and it was the fourth-largest 
corporate PAC in the U.S. in terms of receipts as of June 30, with $ 1.2 million. But 
chief rival United Parcel Service is No. 2 with $ 1.9 million, and both shrink in size 
compared with the Teamsters PAC’s $ 6.2 million in receipts. 
Id. 
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Teamster President Ron Carey cut off Teamster funding to the 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.358 
Moreover, if the cloture vote was not critical—that is, if the 
Democrats voting against cloture knew their votes would be of little 
use—and if the Democrats realized their symbolic votes against 
cloture would signal their support to organized labor, how should 
those votes be analyzed?  The cloture vote, like the vote on trucking 
deregulation considered in Subsection II.B.1 above, demonstrates that 
votes cast may differ dramatically in their significance.  Even if 
empirical studies could demonstrate a causal relationship between 
campaign contributions and votes, that relationship would not 
necessarily prove that the contributions had a meaningful impact on 
legislative policy.  Rather, the analysis highlights the fact that 
empirical studies need to incorporate an analysis of significance when 
counting votes.  
D.  Noise Regulation 
Airplanes are noisy, and the aviation industry has continually 
dealt with efforts to regulate the noise produced by take-offs and 
landings.  As aircraft grew in size and an increasing percentage of 
aircraft were commercial jets, the problems of aircraft noise 
intensified.359  Local communities responded by imposing noise 
regulations.  Even as FedEx was beginning its operations in the mid-
1970s, the battle between airlines and local communities was heating 
up.  Anti-noise groups successfully challenged aircraft noise through 
litigation.360  Individual communities and airports began to restrict 
aircraft noise through zoning, noise limits, and curfews.361 
 
 358. Novak, supra note 355, at A6. 
 359. The aircraft noise externality has been described as a classic market failure justifying 
government regulation. Steven A. Morrison, et al., Fundamental Flaws of Social Regulation: The 
Case of Airplane Noise, 42 J. L. & ECON., 723, 723 (1999). The decision of airlines to move from 
point to point flying to the hub and spoke system also increased the problem of aircraft noise by 
overburdening primary hub airports. See Luis G. Zambrano, Balancing the Rights of Landowners 
with the Needs of Airports: The Continuing Battle over Noise, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 445, 450 (2000) 
(explaining that noise problems are exacerbated as flights are added and runway capacity is 
increased). 
 360. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 
U.S. 256, 268 (1946) (upholding inverse condemnation claims); See also Mary Jo Soenksen, Note, 
Airports: Full of Sound and Fury and Conflicting Legal Views, 12 TRANSP. L. J. 325, 335 (1982) 
(claiming that noise-related litigation claims for inverse condemnation and nuisance between 
1971 and 1976, cost airport owners more than $ 28 million). 
 361. An additional method of controlling aircraft noise was with noise-related fees. See, e.g., 
John Davies, Washington State Legislators Propose Fees on Noisy Jets, J. COM., Feb. 2, 1990, at 
5B (describing state proposal to impose extra landing charges for noisy aircraft). 
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Noise regulation was a particular problem for the air carrier 
industry. Unlike passenger airlines, most air carriers flew at night, 
when noise regulations were most restrictive.362 A 1972 survey found 
that only 25% of passengers arrived or departed between the hours of 
10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., but 90% of all cargo and mail moved in and 
out of airports during those hours.363  In addition, many carriers, 
especially new entrants, were flying older and noisier aircraft that 
they were able to purchase more cheaply than newer models.364 
In 1968, Congress amended the Federal Aviation Act to grant 
the FAA specific power to address aircraft noise and to include noise 
considerations in the exercise of its regulatory authority.365  The FAA 
responded to this directive by issuing Federal Aviation Rule (“FAR”) 
36, which established procedures for measuring and limiting aircraft 
noise.366  Anti-noise groups, however, generally viewed the FAA’s 
actions as unsatisfactory.367 
Congress subsequently adopted the Noise Control Act of 
1972.368  The most significant aspect of the Act was its impact on state 
and local regulation of aircraft noise.  In City of Burbank v. Lockheed 
 
 362. See, e.g., Government Policies on Aircraft Noise: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 99th Cong. 578-79 (1986) 
(testimony of Robert P. Silverberg, Counsel, Airborne Express) [hereinafter Government Policies 
on Aircraft Noise Hearings] (describing how the majority of Airborne Express’s flights take place 
during the late evening and early morning hours). 
 363. Eugene Kozicharow, Federal Action Needed to Block Curfews, AVIATION WK., Mar. 8, 
1976 (reporting results of a 1972 survey by Airport Operators Council International at U.S. 
airports). 
 364. See Government Policies on Aircraft Noise Hearings, supra note 362, at 590 (testimony 
of Kevin Flynn, Assistant General Counsel, People Express) (explaining that noise regulations 
imposed a disproportionate impact on new entrants who flew the relatively less expensive stage 
2 aircraft). 
 365. Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. 1431 (2005)). 
 366. Among the key elements of FAR 36 was a procedure for classifying aircraft according to 
noise levels and a prohibition on the certification of new aircraft that did not meet specified noise 
standards. Adoption of Noise Type Certification Standards and Procedures, 34 Fed. Reg. 18,355 
(1969) (codified at various sections of 14 C.F.R. §§ 21, 36). Aircraft were divided into three 
categories or “stages” depending on the aircraft’s size and number of engines. See Kristin L. 
Falzone, Comment, Airport Noise Pollution: Is There a Solution in Sight?, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 769, 783 n.129 (1999) (explaining criteria for different stages). FAR 36 was subsequently 
extended to most aircraft with maximum weights over 75,000 pounds manufactured after Dec. 1, 
1973. Noise Standards for Newly Produced Airplanes of Older Type Design, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,569 
(1973) (codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.183(e), 36.1(a)(d)(1-3)). 
 367. See, e.g., John J. Jenkins Jr., The Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990: Has Congress 
Finally Solved the Aircraft Noise Problem? 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 1023, 1032 (1994) (describing new 
regulations as “a disappointment to anti-noise groups”). 
 368. Pub. L. No. 92-574, 92 Stat. 1239 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1431). Among 
other things, the 1972 legislation involved the Environmental Protection Agency in the 
regulation of aircraft noise. See Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1033 (describing role of the EPA 
under the 1972 statute). 
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Air Terminal, Inc.,369 the Supreme Court concluded that the Noise 
Control Act preempted local regulation of aircraft noise.370  In 
addition, the Court found that the nationwide imposition of curfews 
and other restrictions would undermine the congressional objectives 
underlying the Federal Aviation Act, including efficient and uniform 
use of navigable airspace.371  In a footnote, however, the Court created 
a limited right for local airport operators to regulate aircraft noise.372  
This right became known as the proprietor’s exemption.373 
The post-Burbank state of regulation was problematic for both 
sides.  In response to continued pressure from anti-noise groups, the 
FAA enacted FAR Part 91 in 1976, which applied stricter standards of 
noise regulation.374  The new FAA rules implemented a phase-out of 
the stage one aircraft, the noisiest type, over an eight-year period.375  
This move was broadly viewed as insufficient, however, and both the 
FAA and Congress faced mounting pressure in the early 1980s to 
implement a phase-out of stage two aircraft.376 
The implementation of stricter noise standards raised several 
concerns. First, the cost of a stage two phase-out was substantial.  
Although the stage one aircraft were of sufficient vintage that they 
were largely being phased out anyway,377 a majority of U.S. 
commercial aircraft were stage two aircraft; replacing them quickly 
would have been extremely expensive.378  Cargo carriers in particular 
warned Congress that forcing them to convert quickly to quieter 
 
 369. 411 U.S. 624 (1973). 
 370. See id. at 633 (holding that the 1972 Act “reaffirms and reinforces the conclusion that 
FAA, now in conjunction with EPA, has full control over aircraft noise, pre-empting state and 
local control”). 
 371. Id. at 639-40. 
 372. Id. at 635 n.14. 
 373. See, e.g., James F. Gesualdi, Note, Gonna Fly Now: All the Noise About the Airport 
Access Problem, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 213 (1987) (summarizing cases applying the Burbank 
proprietor’s exception and upholding curfews). 
 374. 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.801-.877 (1997). See Falzone, supra note 366, at 786 (describing noise 
standards imposed by FAR Part 91). 
 375. Id. 
 376. See Lyn Loyd Creswell, Airport Policy in the United States: The Need for Accountability, 
Planning, and Leadership, 19 TRANSP. L. J. 1, 56 (1990) (describing demand for stage two phase-
out). 
 377. See Mary Beth Franklin, FAA to Crack Down on Aircraft Noise, UPI, Dec. 26, 1984 
(observing that stage one aircraft, first manufactured in the 1950s, were largely phased out by 
the FAA deadline and indicating that only 85 stage one aircraft were being operated by domestic 
airlines). 
 378. See Creswell, supra note 376, at 56 (explaining that, in 1988, stage two aircraft made up 
58% of U.S. commercial aircraft, and that cost of immediately replacing them with stage three 
aircraft would have been $50 billion). These costs would be reduced substantially by a slower 
phase-out. Id. 
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aircraft would pose “devastating consequences” for the industry.379 
Second, the FAA had retained the power to exempt airlines from the 
requirements of Part 91.380  Airlines were concerned about making 
substantial capital expenditures to comply with the new standards 
and then being disadvantaged if the FAA selectively exempted their 
competitors from the stage two phase-out.381  Third, and perhaps most 
important, cargo carriers were concerned that, despite the FAA’s 
increasingly strict noise regulations, local airports and municipalities 
would continue to impose curfews and other operating restrictions.  
They argued that these restrictions particularly burdened cargo 
carriers382 and that they should explicitly be preempted by a uniform 
national noise policy.383 
In 1986, Smith explained to Congress that “there is no other 
issue that has any more crucial significance for us and our very able 
competitors than this issue of noise.”384  Smith testified that the only 
workable solution was federal noise standards coupled with federal 
preemption of local restrictions such as airport curfews.385  In 
particular, Smith argued that it was unreasonable to require airlines 
to phase out stage two aircraft if they could not be assured of airport 
access, including nighttime access, for compliant stage three planes.386 
  Congress responded.  In November 1990, Congress passed the 
Aircraft Noise and Capacity Act of 1990 (“ANCA”).387  In adopting the 
legislation, Congress stressed the importance of formulating a 
national noise policy.  ANCA’s key components included the 
establishment of a national noise policy and a schedule for the phasing 
 
 379. Leo Abruzzese, Cargo Carriers State Access and Noise Case, J. COM., May 10, 1989, at 
5B. 
 380. See Franklin, supra note 377 (quoting FAA statement describing a “large volume of last 
minute petitions for exemptions from the standards”). 
 381. See Air Cargo and Passenger Deregulation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation 
of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 96th Cong. 250 (1979) (testimony of 
Frederick Smith) (explaining that FedEx did not want to make the investment of buying aircraft 
that complied with the standards of FAR 36 only to find that the FAA was going to exempt its 
competitors, such as Evergreen or Emery, from compliance). 
 382. See Abruzzese, supra note 379, at 5B (describing concerns of cargo carriers regarding 
restrictions on nighttime takeoffs and landings). 
 383. See Comments of Federal Express Corporation before the Dept. of Transport., FAA, 
Wash., DC, Dec. 10, 1985 at 3 reprinted in Government Policies on Aircraft Noise Hearings, supra 
note 362, at 534 (describing serious concern over “the failure, to date, of the federal government 
to preempt local regulations relating to aircraft and airport noise”). 
 384. Government Policies on Aircraft Noise Hearings, supra note 362, at 508 (testimony of 
Frederick W. Smith). 
 385. Id. at 510. 
 386. Id. at 512. 
 387. 49 U.S.C. §§ 47521-47533 (2005). 
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out of all stage two aircraft by the year 2000.388  ANCA explicitly 
prohibited the adoption of local restrictions on the operation of aircraft 
that met stage three standards of compliance, unless such local 
restrictions were first approved by the FAA.389  Even with respect to 
noisier stage two aircraft, ANCA required airport operators to go 
through a formal notice-and-comment procedure in order to impose 
restrictions.390 
Although proponents of ANCA argued that it would 
substantially reduce aircraft noise,391 ANCA was widely viewed as a 
victory for air carriers.392  Critics observed that airline industry 
sponsors were able to “sneak” the legislation through Congress in the 
final days of the 1990 session.393  As one commentator explained, “No 
public hearings were held, and although committee staffers consulted 
industry lobbyists during the bill’s markup, representatives of airport 
operators were not consulted.”394   
It is important to recognize, however, that ANCA did not have 
the same effect on all carriers.  First, by requiring airlines to achieve 
stage three compliance, ANCA favored larger and more established 
airlines over small and upstart carriers.395  Thus, ANCA enhanced 
FedEx’s competitive position relative to newer and less financially 
 
 388. See Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1036-1053 (describing details of ANCA provisions). 
 389. Id. at 1038. ANCA also largely eliminated the role of the EPA in airport noise 
abatement. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Lessons From A Public Policy Failure: EPA and Noise 
Abatement, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 58-60 (1992) (describing ANCA’s effect in shifting greater 
control to the FAA). 
 390. Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1041; see also Zambrano, supra note 359, at 460. 
 391. See Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1037 (describing claims that ANCA would reduce 
aircraft noise). 
 392. See, e.g., Mitchell E. Macdonald, Tax Compromise Contains Good News, Bad News for 
Transport Agency, 29 TRAFFIC MGMT. 13 (Dec. 1990) (describing air carriers as “elated” in 
response to the new legislation); Falzone, supra note 366, at 788 (describing Congress as passing 
ANCA “in response to the air industry’s lobbying efforts.”). 
 393. Shapiro, supra note 389, at 59, n.350. See also Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1036-37 
(describing how ANCA was passed “in the waning hours of the 1990 Congressional session”). 
 394. Shapiro, supra note 389, at 59, n.350. This characterization is not entirely accurate. As 
indicated above, Congress had previously held hearings to consider legislation to establish a 
national aircraft noise policy. See supra notes 362-368 and accompanying text. In addition, prior 
to ANCA’s adoption, the House Subcommittee on Aviation held four days of hearings on Federal 
Aviation Noise. Federal Aviation Noise Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the 
House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 101st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter Federal 
Aviation Noise Policy Hearings]. 
 395. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Noise Policy Hearings, at 394 (testimony of Brian Cole, 
General Counsel, Burlington Air Express) (describing the burden imposed by a requirement of 
conversion to stage three aircraft and proposing a “de minimis” exemption for “all-cargo 
operations with two or three flights a day at a particular airport). 
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stable entrants.396  FedEx’s dominant position in the industry enabled 
it to bear these costs more easily than its many smaller competitors.  
Indeed, ANCA was enacted precisely when a significant number of 
smaller carriers were making efforts to expand their aircraft 
operations in order to compete in the market with FedEx.  Noise 
regulation raised the cost of doing so.397  Second, federal preemption of 
local noise restrictions provided a disproportionate benefit to cargo 
carriers, which were most affected by the imposition of airport 
curfews. 
An additional component of ANCA’s implementation was of 
particular value to FedEx.  In developing regulations for noise 
abatement under ANCA, the FAA adopted a performance-based 
measure of compliance rather than a design-based measure of 
compliance.398  Under the performance approach, airlines were able to 
meet stage three standards either by purchasing the newer and 
quieter stage three engines or by installing hush kits which enabled 
stage two engines to meet the stage three noise requirements.  
Although it was not clear that retrofitting stage two aircraft with hush 
kits was comparable to purchasing stage three engines in terms of 
reducing aircraft noise,399 a position subsequently taken by the 
European Union,400 the hush kits substantially reduced the financial 
burden associated with meeting ANCA’s requirements.401  FedEx, 
which flew a large number of stage two Boeing 727 aircraft,402 chose to 
address the regulatory issue by retrofitting its planes with hush 
kits.403  Thus the performance-based standard enabled FedEx to 
 
 396. See id., at 359-90 (statement of Rep. Duncan, Member, House Subcomm. on Aviation) 
(noting risk that only big companies would be able to comply with proposed rules and small 
companies would be driven out of business). 
 397. Hill Interview V, Apr. 15, 2002, supra note 28 (observing that ANCA was a good 
strategic decision for large companies such as FedEx and UPS that could pay the costs associated 
with regulatory compliance, because it would have the effect of “keep[ing] out the little guys”). 
 398. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 36.1(f)(5)-(6) (1991) (defining “Stage 3 noise level” and “Stage 3 
airplane”). See also Benedicte A. Claes, Aircraft Noise Regulation in the European Union: The 
Hushkit Problem, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 329, 347-58 (2000) (describing and defending the 
alternative design- based measure of compliance adopted by the European Union). 
 399. See Claes, supra note 398, at 347-58. 
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Rules, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 27, 2002. 
 401. See Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1052 (describing hush kits). 
 402. See Ira Breskin, Freighter “Hushkits’ Feasible, Engine Manufacturer Says, J. COM., Nov. 
24, 1989, at 5B (describing FedEx as “one of the largest operators” of later generation 727s). 
 403. Zarocostas, supra note 400, at 27. 
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continue its preferred approach to noise compliance.  In contrast, UPS 
phased-out its use of stage two engines by purchasing new engines for 
all its planes.404  Accordingly, a design-based standard would have 
benefited UPS relative to FedEx. 
FedEx also benefited from the FAA’s acceptance of the hush kit 
approach because FedEx manufactured and sold hush kits for Boeing 
727 aircraft through its subsidiary, Federal Express Aviation Services, 
Inc.405 FedEx, jointly with Pratt and Whitney, developed a 727 hush 
kit and received approval for several types of hush kits even before the 
adoption of ANCA.406  The FAA’s certification of hush kits as an 
acceptable way for carriers to meet stage three requirements, coupled 
with the adoption of ANCA, dramatically increased the market for 
hush kits.407  As a result, FedEx was able to sell the kits, which bore 
million dollar price tags, to other carriers.408 
In sum, ANCA offered FedEx relief from curfews and other 
local noise restrictions at the cost of compliance with federal noise 
regulations.  The federal noise regulations were specifically structured 
in a way that favored FedEx relative to its competitors and created a 
commercial market for FedEx’s hush kits.  Moreover, although ANCA 
appeared on its face to be a statute of general application, it was 
widely understood as being tailored to favor FedEx’s interests.  As one 
“enraged housewife” described it, ANCA was “a bad bill, made 
specifically for Federal Express, which operates an older fleet mostly 
at night.”409 
 
 404. Id. 
 405. See Debra Sykes, Carriers Turn down the Volume of Aircraft Noise, 114 GLOBAL TRADE 
& TRANSP. 30 (July 1994) (describing FedEx as a “leader” in marketing and assembling the hush 
kit for 727s). 
 406. See Breskin, supra note 402, at 513 (describing joint venture with Pratt and Whitney); 
Stanley W. Kandebo, Noise Compliance Rules Boost Airline Interest in Hushkits, 135 AVIATION 
WK. & SPACE TECH. 56 (Aug. 5, 1991) (reporting that FedEx received FAA approval for its first 
hush kit in May 1989, its second in Feb. 1990 and its third in Nov. 1990). FedEx subsequently 
received FAA approval for its heavyweight hush kits in 1993. See Dave Hirschman, Aircraft: Fed 
Ex Gets Approval for Heavy “Hush Kits,” COM. APPEAL, Sept. 13, 1993, at B4 (reporting the 
FAA’s approval of FedEx’s heavyweight hush kits for 727s). 
 407. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 367, at 1052 (explaining that hush kits offered carriers a 
cheaper alternative to buying new planes or engines to meet stage 3 requirements); Kandebo, 
supra note 406, at 56 (describing airlines’ increased interest in hush kits as a result of ANCA). 
 408. See, e.g., Kandebo, supra note 406, at 56 (describing hush kit prices as ranging from 
$1.6 - $1.85 million each, installed); Hirschman, supra note 406, at B4 (reporting that FedEx had 
received firm orders for over 100 hush kits at prices from $ 1.65 million to $2.45 million 
installed). 
 409. Don Carter, New Airport Noise Law Did Little to Clear Air, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 22, 1991, at B5 (quoting Carla Janes, a Washington resident). 
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E.  Other Lawmaking Initiatives 
Although a complete analysis of the major lawmaking 
initiatives in which FedEx has been involved is beyond the scope of 
this Article, the issues described in Sections A through D above are 
typical of FedEx’s efforts in several ways.  First, these were 
lawmaking issues in which FedEx sought legal changes that were of 
substantial financial significance to its operations.  For FedEx, 
political activity was not a diversion of operating funds but rather an 
integrated part of its business strategy.  Second, with the exception of 
the FAA “express company” rider, the issues were of general 
application, extending beyond FedEx and its operations.  Third, as the 
case study demonstrates, FedEx’s political involvement was far more 
extensive and complex than the making of campaign contributions to 
targeted legislators.  Fourth, FedEx ultimately was successful in 
obtaining the desired regulatory changes although, in many cases, the 
effort extended over a prolonged period of time.410  Finally, although 
the resulting legal changes applied broadly, in each case they provided 
particularized benefits to FedEx. 
This pattern extends to other issues as well.  An important 
example is FedEx’s effort to compete with the United States Postal 
Service (“USPS”).  At its inception, FedEx faced the problem of the 
Private Express Statutes, which prohibit private firms from delivering 
mail411 and thus precluded FedEx from expanding its operations to 
deliver letters.412  FedEx was constrained in its ability to challenge the 
Post Office’s monopoly, not only because the USPS was a powerful 
political adversary,413 but also because FedEx relied heavily on 
 
 410. Importantly, the balance of political forces is dynamic and, as they say, past 
performance is no guarantee of future success. Although FedEx continues to use similar political 
tools, a recent instance in which FedEx has, to date, failed to prevail is its dispute with the 
Department of Transportation over its claim for compensation in connection with the Sept. 11th 
attacks. See, e.g., Angela Greiling Keane, DOT Wins FedEx Court Bout, Traffic World, July 12, 
2004, at 31 (describing FedEx’s unsuccessful attempt to challenge DOT compensation procedures 
in federal court); Angela Greiling Keane, Van Tine Advances; FedEx Continues to Oppose 
Nominee for No. 2 Spot at DOT; Full Senate to Vote, TRAFFIC WORLD, Nov. 24, 2003, at 13 
(describing unsuccessful efforts by FedEx to block the nomination of Kirk Van Tine as deputy 
secretary of transportation). 
 411. 39 U.S.C. §§ 601-06 (2005); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693-99 (2005). More seriously punishable than 
merely carrying mail is the creation of a private express network capable of competing with the 
USPS. 18 U.S.C. § 1696. 
 412. Importantly, the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Private Express 
Statutes in 1978. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 574 F.2d 712, 716 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1115 (1979). 
 413. As one commentator reports: 
The Postal Service, perhaps more than any other agency, is composed of politically 
powerful interest groups hostile to change.  The agency’s 800,000 workers and 25,000 
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revenue that it received for transporting mail delivered by the 
USPS.414  Openly criticizing the government monopoly would 
jeopardize this revenue.415 
FedEx resolved the issue by securing a limited exception to the 
Private Express Statutes for courier services—the transport of items 
on a time-sensitive basis for which cost considerations were less 
important.416  Smith argued to Congress that these courier services 
did not compete with the USPS’s delivery of the mail and thus did not 
threaten its monopoly.417  Ultimately in 1979, faced with the threat of 
congressional action, the USPS created an exemption from the Private 
Express Statutes for “extremely urgent letters.”418  The exemption was 
specifically tailored to the needs of FedEx, enabling the company to 
carry letters for overnight delivery. In response to this regulatory 
change, FedEx significantly transformed its operations, shifting its 
focus from parcels to urgent business letters—a change that allowed 
FedEx to grow dramatically.419 
As with air cargo deregulation, this initiative occurred at an 
early stage of FedEx’s operations.  FedEx was not, in the late 1970s, 
the type of large public company envisioned by the Supreme Court in 
its campaign finance decisions that could influence the political 
process through massive corporate donations.  Rather, the story 
leading to the urgent letter exemption is similar to that of the Federal 
Express Act—a fledgling company identified a regulatory issue that 
 
postal managers exert enormous influence on Capitol Hill.  Legislators are very 
hesitant to upset the postal unions, whose members live in every congressional 
district in the country. 
See Thomas M. Lenard, The United States Postal Service, HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPS (1989). 
 414. See Dave Hirschman, UPS Slams FedEx, Postal Plans, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 8, 
2000, at 1F (explaining that revenue from the USPS kept FedEx going during the mid 1970s). 
 415. See Postal Oversight: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Post Office and Civil 
Service, 93rd Cong. 291 (1973) (testimony of William Gelfand, VP, Flying Tiger Line, Inc.) 
(explaining that “the U.S. Postal Service reserves its own right to give mail to whom it desires 
without any established policies”). 
 416. The Private Express Statutes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postal Service of the 
House Comm on Post Office and Civil Service, 93rd Cong. 34-35 (1973) (statement of Frederick 
W. Smith); see also id. at 43 (testimony of Frederick W. Smith) (proposing either time sensitive 
or rate sensitive test for exception to statutory monopoly). 
 417. See id. at 25-36 (statement of Frederick W. Smith) (explaining why the provision of 
special services did not compete with the USPS). 
 418. 39 C.F.R. § 320.6 (2005). The Postal Service defined such letters as those that met 
either a time of delivery test or a price test. 39 C.F.R. § 320.6(b)(1) (2005). 
 419. In June 1981, FedEx introduced the FedEx Overnight letter and within two months the 
new service was generating $100,000 in revenues per night. See Airline Observer, AVIATION WK. 
& SPACE TECH., Aug. 17, 1981, at 35 (explaining how declining package size was responsible for 
increasing FedEx revenues). By 1982, following its expansion into the overnight letter industry, 
FedEx’s net profits had reached $78m and reflected an amazing 16% of revenues. Federal 
Express; First Past the Parcel Post, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1982, at 78. 
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was of key importance to its business strategy and educated 
government policymakers about the issue through testimony, coalition 
building, and developing relationships with political officials. 
FedEx’s competition with the USPS did not end with the 
urgent letter exemption to the Private Express Statutes.  Indeed, as 
FedEx’s size and political influence grew, FedEx’s challenges became 
bolder.  In 1995, FedEx asked Congress to eliminate the USPS 
monopoly.420  In 1997, FedEx sued the USPS for violating the Lanham 
Act421 through advertisements that falsely claimed that the USPS’s 
Priority Mail offered comparable service to that of FedEx.422  Although 
legislative relief remained elusive, FedEx’s political power eventually 
led to a market-based resolution.423  In 2001, FedEx and the USPS 
publicly announced the creation of a $6 billion, seven-year joint 
venture.  The deal gave FedEx the right to haul USPS Express Mail, 
Priority Mail, and some first-class mail as well as the right to place 
FedEx drop boxes outside, and in some cases inside, government post 
offices.424 
FedEx’s experience with respect to international air shipping 
rights has been similar.  Traditionally, gaining the right to fly 
international routes has been a complex political issue.  Routes are the 
subject of bilateral agreements between countries that, in most cases, 
 
 420. See Oversight Hearings on the United States Postal Service: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Postal Service of the House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th 
Cong. (1995) (testimony of James Campbell, Jr., Counsel, Federal Express) (testifying that the 
USPS should “give up the monopoly and other special rights”). 
 421. Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2005), prohibits “any person” from 
making false or misleading representations of fact that would cause confusion as to the source, 
sponsorship, approval, association or origin of goods or services in the marketplace. 
 422. Although the USPS argued that, as a federal agency, it was immune from suit, the 
courts sided with FedEx. Fed. Express Corp. v. U.S. Postal Service, 959 F. Supp. 832, 840 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1997), aff’d., Fed. Express Corp. v. U. S. Postal Serv., 151 F.3d 536, 546 (6th Cir. 1998). 
The USPS then settled the suit by agreeing to drop the advertising campaign. See Ira Teinowitz 
& Sean Callahan, Post Office Axes Ads Rapping its Rivals, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 7, 1998, at 1 
(attributing USPS decision to drop the controversial ads to the negotiations to end the FedEx 
lawsuit); Bill McAllister, FedEx Delivers Blow to Ad Campaign by Postal Service, WASH. POST., 
Dec. 9, 1998, at C11 (stating agency officials had confirmed the Advertising Age report). 
 423. That FedEx’s political power was a significant factor in the deal is strongly suggested by 
the fact that FedEx was awarded the contract on a sole source basis rather than through a 
competitive bidding process. Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1071, 
1075 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 424. Eileen Kennedy, Federal Express Forms Alliance with U.S. Postal Service, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Nashua, N.H.), Jan. 11, 2001. Notably, FedEx replaced Emery, which previously 
had a contract to deliver a portion of the Priority and Express mail. Id. Emery challenged the 
procedure by which FedEx was awarded the contract, and lost. Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. 
United States, 264 F.3d at 1089. 
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sharply restrict the number of permitted flights and carriers.425  
Routes to Asia have been particularly restricted.426  At the same time, 
routes to Asia constitute an increasingly important component of the 
air cargo business, making increased service to Asia particularly 
desirable for FedEx.427 
FedEx did not rely exclusively on political activity to obtain 
access to Asian routes.  Indeed, its primary source of access was 
commercial: FedEx purchased the right to fly to China from Evergreen 
in 1995 and obtained the right to fly to Japan by acquiring Flying 
Tiger in 1988.428  Nonetheless, FedEx deployed its political capital 
aggressively to secure and improve its position.429  Importantly, with 
respect to international air routes, these efforts frequently provided 
FedEx with specific advantages relative to its competitors.430 
For example, in the mid 1990s, FedEx sought increased air 
rights to Japan, in part to facilitate FedEx’s use of its new hub in the 
Philippines.431  Japan resisted, leading FedEx to complain to the 
Department of Transportation and to Congress.432  When Japan 
resisted, FedEx used its influence in the Senate to have a resolution 
introduced threatening sanctions against Japanese airlines.433  Japan 
 
 425. See, e.g., Gabriel S. Meyer, Note, U.S. - China Aviation Relations: Flight Path Toward 
Open Skies?, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 427, 428-30 (2002) (describing bilateral agreements and 
resulting restrictions). 
 426. See id. at 429 (describing restrictions imposed by existing treaty between U.S. and 
China); see generally Derek Lick, Note, More Turbulence Ahead: A Bumpy Ride During U.S.-
Japanese Aviation Talks Exemplifies the Need for A Pragmatic Course in Future Aviation 
Negotiations, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1207 (1998) (describing hostilities between U.S. and 
Japan over proposals to expand air rights). 
 427. See, e.g., Lick, supra note 426, at 1222-24 (describing the importance of the Japanese 
cargo market). 
 428. Rick Brooks, UPS Seems to Chip Away at FedEx’s Big Lead in China-Company Works 
Hard to Get Its Own Direct Flights Into Growing Market, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2000, at B4; see 
also Douglas A. Blackmon & Diane Brady, Orient Express: Just How Hard Should A U.S. 
Company Woo A Big Foreign Market?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1998, at A1 (describing FedEx’s 
acquisition of the routes). 
 429. Asra Q. Nomani & Douglas A. Blackmon, Reoriented: How Maneuvering By Airlines 
Shaped U.S.-Japan Accord, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1998, at A1 (detailing FedEx’s political activity 
leading to a favored position under the new aviation treaty with Japan). 
 430. For example, FedEx’s operations in China are significantly more developed than those 
of rival UPS. See Brooks, supra note 428, at 134 (reporting that “UPS is having trouble chipping 
away at FedEx’s big lead in China”). See also Lick, supra note 426, at 1209 (stating that “most of 
the revenues” generated by air cargo operating in the Japanese market have gone to one carrier, 
FedEx). 
 431. Nomani & Blackmon, supra note 429, at A1. 
 432. See, e.g., International Aviation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Frederick Smith) (detailing 
FedEx’s complaints about Japan’s refusal to approve FedEx’s route applications). 
 433. Nomani & Blackmon, supra note 429, at A1. 
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responded by approving additional FedEx flights.434  In August 1996, 
Smith obtained a private forty-five minute meeting with President 
Clinton regarding FedEx’s need for increased routes to Japan. 435 The 
Administration made protection of FedEx’s rights a key component of 
subsequent negotiations436 and, ultimately, in 1998, the United States 
and Japan reached agreement on a new treaty.437  As the Wall Street 
Journal reported, the “biggest winner” under the treaty was FedEx.438 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE STUDY 
A.  Political Activity and Corporate Operations 
The FedEx case study demonstrates that the characterization 
of corporate political activity as a diversion of operating funds is, at 
best, naive.  U.S. corporations operate within a complex legal 
infrastructure, and the regulatory environment is an integral part of 
market decisions for corporations as well as a key factor in their 
growth and strategic planning.  FedEx, and indeed the entire air cargo 
industry, could not have gotten off the ground without air cargo 
deregulation.  FedEx’s ability to develop and serve its customer base 
was critically enhanced by the urgent letter exemption, which enabled 
it to deliver letters as well as freight.  Noise standards, labor rules, 
and trucking regulation directly affected FedEx’s operating costs, 
influencing the manner in which FedEx developed its business plan, 
affecting its pricing structure, and defining its key industry 
competitors. 
Campaign finance scholars and the Supreme Court have 
isolated corporate political activity without considering the 
relationship of politics to the firm’s business strategy.  Corporate 
scholars may emphasize marketplace competition at the cost of 
overlooking nonmarket strategies.  Yet, as the FedEx story shows, 
firm competition takes place both in the marketplace and in the 
political arena; the dynamics of one environment affect the other.439 
 
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. 
 437. See Lick, supra note 426, at 1254-59 (analyzing the new agreement). 
 438. Nomani & Blackmon, supra note 429, at A1. 
 439. Although this Article has focused upon the effect of political activity on business 
operations, a firm’s business operations also affect its political environment and may arguably be 
viewed as part of its political strategy. See, e.g., Sara F. Ellison & Catherine Wolfram, 
Pharmaceutical Prices and Political Activity 1 (Working Paper 2001) (explaining how 
pharmaceutical firms voluntarily reduced prices in the face of public pressure in a successful 
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Importantly, the connection between politics and business is 
not unique to FedEx.  In attempting to implement its market strategy, 
MCI, for example, faced similar regulatory barriers to entry.  MCI 
could not engage in marketplace competition with AT&T over the 
provision of long distance telephone service unless regulatory change 
eliminated AT&T’s monopoly.440  MCI invested in political capital and, 
despite AT&T’s substantial political clout, successfully obtained 
regulatory change–deregulation of the long distance industry.441  
Following this success, MCI continued to be a dominant political 
player and successfully used its political capital on a range of other 
issues.442  Indeed, MCI’s view of the importance of Washington politics 
seems to rival that of FedEx, as reflected in its purchase of the naming 
rights to the MCI Center.443 
Another example is Enron.  Deregulation of the energy 
industry was a key component of Enron’s business plan.444  Enron 
developed its political capital—making large political contributions 
and building relationships with state and federal government 
officials445—in order to obtain regulatory changes that would enable it 
to build its energy trading market.446  Having established this political 
capital, Enron continued to use it.  Thus, Senator Phil Gramm was 
instrumental in insuring that the Commodity Futures Modernization 
 
effort to avoid price regulation and arguing that the most politically vulnerable firms were most 
responsive to the threat of regulation). 
 440. See Hart, supra note 17, at 58-59 (explaining that “MCI’s success would have been 
impossible without deregulation of the telecommunications industry”). 
 441. Id. at 59. 
 442. See Mike Mills, Telecom’s Lavish Spending on Lobbying, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1998, at 
H01 (describing MCI’s extensive political activity and suggesting that this activity was related to 
MCI’s receipt of regulatory approval for its merger with WorldCom). 
 443. See Rudolph A. Pyatt Jr., Bricks and Mortar Built Year’s Top Local Business Stories, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1998, at C03 (describing MCI’s multi-million dollar purchase of the naming 
rights to the MCI Center in Washington). 
 444. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. 
REV. 1275, 1278 (2002) (explaining that Enron’s “primary business, energy trading, only came 
into existence in the wake of deregulation of electricity and natural gas production and supply”). 
 445. Like FedEx, Enron’s political strategy consisted of a combination of large political 
expenditures and the cultivation of relationships with public officials and policymakers. See 
Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE 
J. ON REG. 471, 474 n.10 (2002) (describing relationships including Enron’s selection of Wendy 
Gramm, wife of Senator Phil Gramm, to serve on its board of directors and Enron’s payment of 
$50,000 to President Bush’s senior economic advisor, Lawrence B. Lindsey to have Lindsey serve 
on Enron’s advisory board). 
 446. See Bratton, supra note 444, at 1278-79 (describing Enron’s extensive political activity 
aimed at eliminating protected energy monopolies, and its success in this efforts); Kurt 
Eichenwald, Enron’s Collapse: Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at 1 (explaining how deregulation enabled Enron to create and dominate 
the nation’s energy trading markets). 
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Act447 included the “Enron Point,” which excluded energy trading 
companies from federal financial oversight.448 
Of course, firms play politics in different ways.  Even the easily 
measured empirical benchmarks of political activity reveal different 
strategies.  The following table provides an illustration: 
 
 
 FedEx UPS American 
Airlines 
United 
Airlines 
PAC Expenditures 1995-96449 943,000 1,788,147 320,817 181,550 
 
Soft Money Contributions 1997-98450 927,750 300,181  497,804  290,927 
 
Lobbying Expenditures 1997451 3,300,000 880,000 5,560,000 1,200,000 
 
Despite the importance of legislative policies to large public 
companies, 40% of Fortune 500 companies do not even have a political 
action committee.452  Nine of the Fortune 100 firms, including IBM, 
have neither established a PAC nor contributed soft money.453  IBM 
does, however, make extensive lobbying expenditures and has a highly 
respected Washington government affairs office.454   
Firms also modify the form of their political participation.  
British Petroleum (“BP”), for example, contributed almost $1.7 million 
to U.S. candidates and political parties from 1999 to 2002.455  In 2002, 
however, Chief Executive Officer Sir John Brown announced that BP 
would cease making political contributions worldwide.456  BP did not 
forswear all political activism; it merely shifted its tactic from 
 
 447. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 
(2000). 
 448. Bratton, supra note 444, at 1279-80. 
 449. THE ALMANAC OF FEDERAL PACS 2000-2001 (Edward Zukerman ed., 2000). 
 450. Center for Responsive Politics, Soft Money, www.opensecrets.org (last visited Nov. 10, 
2005. 
 451. Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbyist Spending: Air Transport, www.opensecrets.org 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 452. Ansolabehere, et al., supra note 18, at 108. The explanation for the failure of more firms 
to establish PACs cannot solely be freeriding. Roughly one-third of industries have no firms at all 
with PACs. Id. 
 453. Hart, supra note 17, at 40-41. 
 454. David M. Hart, Why Do Some Firms Give? Why Do Some Give a Lot?: High-Tech PACs, 
1977-1996, 63 J. POL. 1230, 1242 (2001). 
 455. Justin Gerdes, Big Oil Still Lubes U.S. Energy Policy, ENVIRON. NEWS NETWORK, Apr. 
5, 2002. 
 456. Id. (reporting Sir Browne’s announcement). 
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campaign contributions to lobbying.457  Indeed, at the same time that 
BP ceased its political donations, the company hired Anji Hunter, one 
of Tony Blair’s closest aides, as director of communications.458 
Empirical studies that focus on a single type of activity, 
therefore, may overlook or distort the extent of a corporation’s political 
involvement.459  Similarly, empirical studies virtually never consider 
more subtle forms of political influence, including lobbying and 
testimony by in-house employees, participation in the “revolving door” 
of hiring former government officials and staffers, development and 
exploitation of relationships between corporate and political leaders, 
and corporate philanthropy.  One of the advantages of the case study 
methodology is that it identifies factors that may be omitted from 
broader based empirical studies.460  These factors are important not 
just in designing campaign finance regulation but also in 
understanding the process by which interest group competition is 
resolved.461  Many of FedEx’s actions are far less transparent forms of 
political influence than PAC expenditures.462  At the same time, there 
are reasons to believe that they are more effective in influencing 
policy–in part because they transmit information that enables a 
political official to understand and to rationalize his support for the 
 
 457. Some current research supports BP’s decision, finding that lobbying expenditures are 
more effective at influencing government policy than political contributions. See Micky Tripathi, 
et. al., Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby 
Disclosure Act, 4 BUS. & POL. 131 (2002) (identifying correlation between PAC contributions and 
lobbying and emphasizing importance of lobbying); J.R. Wright, Contributions, Lobbying and 
Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 84 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 417 (1990) (finding 
that the number of lobbying contacts was a better predictor of legislators’ votes than campaign 
contributions). 
 458. Rosemary Bennett & Astrid Wendlandt, Business Finds New Ways for Its Presents to Be 
Felt, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2003, at 4. 
 459. See, e.g., Moe, supra note 29, at 1095 (observing that empirical studies “focus only on 
very small parts of the whole” and therefore “omit factors whose causal effects may overwhelm or 
distort the ‘special’ relationships on which they singularly focus”). 
 460. See also Witold Henisz & Bennet Zelner, The Strategic Organization of Political Risks 
and Opportunities, 1 STRATEGIC ORG. 451, 451 (2003) (identifying the importance of bringing the 
insights of strategic organization to political activity and urging scholars to focus greater 
attention on the process by which corporations identify and exploit political opportunities). 
 461. See, e.g., id., at 456 (finding that interest group concentration and power do not 
guarantee success in obtaining policy objectives and finding heterogeneity in interest group 
effectiveness depending on their capabilities to manage political risks and opportunities). Among 
the factors that Henisz and Zelner identify as important are firms’ skills in understanding their 
policymaking environment, “cultivating relationships, building and maintaining coalitions, 
framing debates in a manner that resonates with powerful external or internal constituencies, 
and enhancing the perceived legitimacy of their behavior.”  Id. 
 462. See also Fisch, supra note 15, at 1101-02 (observing that politically vulnerable 
companies make generous charitable contributions and publicize those contributions and arguing 
that such contributions may be motivated by an effort to generate goodwill from policymakers). 
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corporation’s policy objectives463 and in part because they look less like 
vote-buying.464 
Is playing politics a good business strategy?  It is hard to know.  
In addition to the challenges of quantifying a firm’s investment in 
political capital, it is difficult to separate the effect of the firm’s 
political activity from other components of its business strategy.  The 
bankruptcies of MCI/WorldCom and Enron make it clear that even 
extraordinary political effectiveness cannot save a firm from the 
effects of bad business decisions or fraud.  Moreover, inter-firm 
comparisons of profitability or shareholder value are likely to be 
misleading as industry competitors may have very different company 
histories, ownership structures, and so forth.  For example, FedEx 
experienced the dramatic growth of a successful start-up company 
from the late 1970s, when UPS was already well established, at least 
with respect to ground shipping.465  Nonetheless, a back of the 
envelope comparison between FedEx and UPS from 1999 to 2004, a 
period during which the two were industry leaders and each others’ 
primary competitors, reveals that a comparable investment in the 
common stock of each company would have produced a cumulative 
return of 107.65% for FedEx466 and 15.37% for UPS.467 
The importance of the legal environment in business operations 
and the role of politics in shaping that environment make it clear that 
corporations cannot and will not abstain from political activity.  
Indeed, these factors explain why regulation of corporate political 
activity has been and will continue to be characterized by corporations 
responding to regulatory limits by developing alternative ways to 
participate in the political process.  Moreover, the range of activities 
by which corporations can and do influence policymaking, despite 
 
 463. See Henisz & Zelner, supra note 460, at 454-55 (explaining that interest groups are 
influential because they provide information to politicians, particularly information that 
legitimizes their desired policy). 
 464. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 454, at 1242-43 (explaining IBM’s decision not to form a PAC 
as based on concerns about the firm’s involvement in campaign finance scandals in the 1970s). 
 465. For example, an investment of $1000 in FedEx stock on April 12, 1978 was worth 
$91,638.67 as of Oct. 27, 2004, reflecting a cumulative return of 9,068.37%. FedEx Investment 
Calculator, http://fdx.client.shareholder.com/calculator.cfm. A Darden School study, however, 
which compares the financial performance of the two companies over the period from 1982 until 
1995, finds that UPS offered substantially better returns to investors and that UPS has 
consistently managed its capital more efficiently than FedEx. Robert F. Bruner & Derick 
Bulkley, The Battle for Value: Federal Express Corporation vs. United Parcel Service of America, 
Inc., UVA-F-1115, Darden School Case Study (July 1997). 
 466.  FedEx Investment Calculator, http://fdx.client.shareholder.com/calculator.cfm.  
(calculating return for an investment of $1,000 from Nov. 10, 1999 to Oct. 27, 2004). 
 467. UPS Investment Calculator, http://www.shareholder.com/ups/calculator.cfm (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2005) (calculating return for an investment of $1000 from Nov. 10, 1999 to Oct. 27, 
2004). 
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increasing statutory efforts to restrict such influence, should give 
pause to regulators.  This analysis suggests a need to rethink the 
existing regulatory structure, a subject to which this Article turns in 
the next Section.468 
B.  The FedEx Story and Campaign Finance Regulation 
Does the FedEx story suggest that attempts to regulate 
corporate political participation are misguided?  In a sense, yes.  
Existing regulatory policy is largely, if not entirely, driven by the 
perception that corporate political activity is illegitimate and should 
be limited.  The preceding discussion argues instead that such activity 
is an important component of corporate business strategy and that 
political efforts are related to and supplement marketplace 
competition.  In addition, the more expansive and textured conception 
of political activity described in this Article explains how corporations 
have developed alternatives to evade existing attempts at regulation 
and why they will continue to do so.  Because corporate political 
activity is inevitable, campaign finance regulation should focus less on 
the issue of whether corporations should participate in politics and 
instead consider the question of how corporations should participate. 
This Article does not argue that existing restrictions on 
corporate political activity should be eliminated, nor does it propose a 
specific regulatory structure.  Such conclusions are beyond the scope 
of this Article and would require both a more extended analysis of the 
existing regulatory framework and, more importantly, a broader 
inquiry into the nature and extent of political activity across a range 
of companies, industries, and time periods.  It would be presumptuous 
to premise a reform agenda on the experience of a single corporation.  
Nonetheless, the FedEx case study identifies several approaches that 
should guide an agenda for regulatory reform. 
First, as the FedEx experience reveals, a substantial amount of 
political activity occurs off the radar screen.  There is no systematic 
mechanism by which corporate involvement with respect to specific 
policy issues is recorded, reported, or disclosed.  The visibility of 
corporate political activity, on an issue specific basis, is happenstance 
and sporadic, depending largely on individual press reports.469  
 
 468. The analysis also suggests limits in the extent to which broad-based empirical research 
accurately captures the nature and effectiveness of political activity, an issue that I explore in 
more detail elsewhere. Fisch, supra note 15. 
 469. Although media research has been remarkably effective in uncovering the role of 
corporations in the political process, as indicated by the references in this Article, the nature and 
extent of press coverage is subject to potential biases. See, e.g., Riccardo Puglisi, Being the New 
  
1564 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:5:1495 
Concededly, recent regulations have increased disclosure 
requirements.  Existing campaign finance laws require the disclosure 
of PAC expenditures and soft money donations,470 and recent federal 
legislation also requires public disclosure of lobbying expenditures.471  
In practice, however, these disclosures are incomplete.  Individual 
firms may mask their activity by acting through a trade association, 
and that association’s members, objectives, and financial structure 
may be only partially transparent.  Although firms must disclose 
funds paid to outside lobbyists, they need not quantify the in-house 
dollars expended on lobbying, nor are the disclosure requirements 
sufficiently detailed as to subject matter.  Firms also need not disclose 
their efforts to generate grassroots lobbying support, a process former 
Senator Lloyd Bentsen has termed “astroturf lobbying.”472  Perhaps 
most importantly, there is no single source in which the range of 
political activity is collected and organized, either by policy initiative 
or by corporation. 
At least two mechanisms could provide more informative 
disclosure.  One approach would involve Congress providing, as part of 
a bill’s legislative history, information on persons and groups that 
participated in the legislative process.  Congress might, for example, 
disclose the identities of those who drafted, testified, and commented 
on proposed legislation, as well as a summary of their testimony or 
position, in the Conference Report or as part of the final statute.  This 
type of disclosure, although foreign to the campaign finance literature, 
is not unprecedented.  Administrative agencies routinely publish the 
formal comments of participants in the rulemaking process and 
include a summary of participant positions as part of the rulemaking 
process.  For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
publishes comment letters on its website473 and, in its adopting 
releases, briefly describes the responses that it received to its requests 
 
York Times: The Political Behaviour of a Newspaper (Massachusetts Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of 
Political Science Working Paper Sept. 24, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=573801 (reporting results of empirical 
research finding New York Times’ coverage during presidential campaigns is influenced by the 
party affiliation of the incumbent president). 
 470. Importantly, disclosed information is posted on the Federal Election Commission’s web 
site, www.fec.gov, enabling direct public access. 
 471. The Center for Responsive Politics posts reported lobbying expenditures, but its data is 
several years old. See Center for Responsive Politics, www.opensecrets.org (last visited Oct. 31, 
2005) (providing lobbying expenditures for 1997 through 2000). 
 472. See Lyon & Maxwell, supra note 84, at 563 (describing astroturf lobbying). 
 473. See Securities and Exchange Commission, How to Submit Comments, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/submitcomments.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) (explaining how to 
submit comments and stating that all comments will be made available to the public and posted 
on the SEC website). 
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for comments.474  This disclosure greatly increases the transparency of 
interest group involvement in the rulemaking process. 
It may also be desirable to incorporate political activity into the 
disclosure requirements applicable to publicly-traded companies 
under the federal securities laws.  In addition to enabling 
shareholders to monitor the activities of a corporation’s officers and 
directors, and thereby to police against possible waste or self-dealing, 
such disclosure would integrate information on political activity with a 
firm’s reporting on the business operations to which the firm’s political 
participation relates.  Although reporting political activity would 
require corporations to make some judgments about the cost and 
purpose of particular expenditures, the requirement would be 
consistent with the growing recognition of the importance of including 
intangibles in financial reporting.475  Moreover, management could 
provide an overview of activities and substantive issues in a narrative 
form as part of the Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
disclosure.476 
The FedEx story also highlights the information component of 
corporate political activity.  Many regulatory issues are highly 
complex, and political officials are poorly positioned to evaluate the 
costs and benefits of policy choices under consideration.477  In contrast, 
corporations are typically knowledgeable about the costs and benefits 
of proposed regulatory changes; indeed, they are likely to be the lowest 
cost providers of information about the effects of regulatory choices 
upon business operations.  The result has long been recognized as an 
information asymmetry that constrains efficient policymaking.478 
 
 474. See, e.g., SEC Final Rule, Short Sales, Sec. & Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-50,103, Jul. 28, 
2004, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-50103.htm (describing comments of industry 
participants in response to proposed short sale price test). 
 475. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan, The GAAP Gap: Corporate Disclosure in the Internet Age, 32 
U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 193, 195-96 (2001) (identifying the need for financial disclosure to 
incorporate increased information about intangible assets); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Breaking 
Through the Intangibles Haze: Business Paradigms and Changing Business Discourse (Working 
Paper 2004) (on file with author) (describing the importance of growth in intangibles to financial 
reporting and business strategy). 
 476. See Item 303 of Regulation S-K, Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Conditions and Results of Operations (“MD&A”), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (requiring management to 
supplement financial disclosure with information about trends, commitments, and other 
transactions that may materially affect issuer’s financial condition). 
 477. See, e.g., Bruce Bimber, Information as a Factor in Congressional Politics, 16 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 585, 597 (1991) (describing legislators as “often uncertain about the relationship 
between political outcomes in the legislature and their actual consequences for constituents”). 
 478. See, e.g., Otto Keck, The Information Dilemma: Private Information as a Cause of 
Transaction Failure in Markets, Regulation, Hierarchy, and Politics, 31 J. CONFLICT. RES. 139, 
155-56 (1987) (citing Max Weber’s earlier work, MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT, 
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Corporate political activity has the potential to overcome the 
information asymmetry if corporations, through their participation in 
policymaking, can obtain beneficial regulatory changes.  Indeed, one of 
the reasons that lobbying may be one of the more effective forms of 
political participation is its role in conveying information to 
policymakers.479  Moreover, corporate political activity is privately 
funded–the corporation that benefits from efficiently structured legal 
rules pays the cost of informing the policymaker about how best to 
structure those rules.  Accordingly, campaign finance rules that 
encourage information production may be socially valuable.  At the 
same time, campaign finance regulation may be able to limit wasteful 
expenditures.480 
This analysis offers a justification for existing limitations on 
naked corporate money expenditures such as direct contributions or 
soft money donations that have little information content.  Such 
limitations may have the effect of channeling expenditures toward 
high information content activities such as lobbying, testimony, and 
other direct contacts.  Regulation might further increase the 
information content of political activity by providing a formal 
structure for the provision of information, such as a written position 
statement in the form of a comment letter (akin to the administrative 
comment process) or as part of the required lobbying disclosure.  Some 
of this information is already provided through written statements 
when corporate officials give formal testimony; the availability of this 
information could be enhanced by including a list of such statements 
in the legislative history. 
Finally, the FedEx story should cause us to think more 
carefully about the nature of special interest legislation.  Policy 
reforms that provide particularized benefits to corporations that have 
actively participated in the regulatory process are typically 
characterized as special interest legislation with the derogatory 
connotation of rentseeking.  As the case study shows, however, 
effective political influence depends on intangibles such as 
relationships and political expertise, rather than mere monetary 
expenditures.  Accordingly, firms face barriers to entering the political 
arena, and those firms that have invested in political capital can 
 
Tuebingen: Mohr (Siebeck) 574 (1980), and stating that recent scholarship concurs with Weber in 
regarding “asymmetric information as one of the main problems in regulation”). 
 479. See, e.g., Scott Ainsworth, Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence, 55 J. POL. 
41, 44-45, 52 (1993) (describing lobbyist role in the provision of information and emphasizing 
quality as well as quantity of lobbyist contacts as a factor in lobbying effectiveness). 
 480. In particular, David Hart distinguishes political efforts that seek industry-wide benefits 
from so-called “arms races.” Hart, supra note 454, at 1231. 
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exploit economies of scale to participate more efficiently.  Thus, the 
structure of the political process causes levels of corporate political 
activity to vary dramatically among firms, even within a given 
industry.  As the following tables demonstrate, FedEx’s political 
expenditures, in addition to its less visible activities, have consistently 
outdistanced those of its industry competitors. 
 
 
 
PAC Contributions481 
 1977-78 1985-86 1989-90 1995-96 1999-2000 
Emery/CNF Transport 0 108,000 99,050 87,000 91,250 
Evergreen 0 0 12,450482 0 0 
Federal Express 8,985 225,500 756,950 943,000 1,175,180 
 
Soft Money Contributions483 
 1997-98 1999-2000 2001-2002 
Emery/CNF Transport 0 0 500 
Evergreen 24,000 140,000 86,000 
Federal Express 927,750 1,327,600 582,469 
 
Lobbying Expenditures484 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Emery/CNF Transport 0 0 0 0 
Evergreen 20,000 0 0 $40,000  
Federal Express 3,300,000 3,320,000 3,320,000 3,320,000 
 
FedEx’s regulatory initiatives—including air cargo 
deregulation, trucking deregulation, aircraft noise regulation, and the 
urgent letter exemption to the Private Express Statutes–benefited its 
peers, and the statistics suggest that other firms may have been 
 
 481. THE ALMANAC OF FEDERAL PACS 1992-1993, at 129 (Edward Zukerman ed., 1992) (for 
1977-1990); THE ALMANAC OF FEDERAL PACS 2000-2001, at 59, 91 (Edward Zukerman ed., 2000) 
(for 1991-1998); Center for Responsive Politics, Data of PAC Contributions to Federal 
Candidates: Air Transport, www.opensecrets.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 482. Center for Responsive Politics, Top Contributors to Federal Candidates and Parties 
(Airlines), Election Cycle 1990, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.asp?Ind=T1100 
&Cycle=1990 (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).  
 483. Center for Responsive Politics, Soft Money Donor Search, www.opensecrets.org (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2005). 
 484. Center for Responsive Politics, Data of Lobbyist Spending: Air Transport, 
www.opensecrets.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
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freeriding on FedEx’s political activities.  Although the specialization 
and the resulting segmentation within an industry between politically 
active firms and freeriders may prevent wasteful duplication of effort, 
this suggests a puzzle as to why FedEx would be willing to incur a 
disproportionate share of the costs of representing its industry in the 
political process. 
The case study offers some insight into this question.  It 
reveals that, although FedEx has generally sought broad-based 
reforms that benefit the entire express carrier industry, each piece of 
legislation provided particularized benefits to FedEx.  For example, 
only FedEx and Flying Tiger benefited from the provision of the 1977 
Air Cargo Deregulation Act that granted existing carriers a one-year 
competition free head start for entry into new markets.485  As one 
commentator explained, this window of opportunity gave FedEx a 
sufficient head start to enable it to dominate the new industry.486  
Trucking deregulation began with the ICC increasing the scope of the 
exemption for services incidental to air cargo transportation and 
included FedEx obtaining a favorable Ninth Circuit decision that 
exempted it from intrastate trucking restrictions.  The final version of 
the statute deregulating intrastate trucking contained a separate 
provision applicable to air carriers,487 providing a measure of 
insulation in the event that the broader provisions of the statute were 
successfully challenged as unconstitutional.488  In seeking relief from 
the Postal Service monopoly, FedEx obtained an exemption–the 
express letter exemption–specifically crafted to enable it to introduce 
the FedEx Overnight Letter.489  FedEx was the first air cargo company 
to introduce overnight letter delivery service and was able to use this 
service to distinguish itself at a time when the air cargo industry was 
becoming increasingly competitive.490 
 
 485. See Dempsey, supra note 134, at 148 (describing this component of the Act as “a rather 
clever provision, allowing established air cargo companies a one year moratorium (from 
November 1977 to November 1978) during which they were free to enter any domestic markets of 
their choice; new entrants would be free to enter only after that period”). 
 486. Id. 
 487. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2005). 
 488. Indeed, the legislation was challenged as unconstitutional, although the Tenth Circuit 
rejected the challenge. Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1511 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
517 U.S. 1166 (1996). 
 489. The exemption was of limited benefit to other cargo carriers that did not rely on air 
transport to the same extent and that were less interested in expanding from cargo to letters, 
such as UPS. 
 490. See Susan Castledine, Competition Grows in Air Freight Package Service, AVIATION. 
WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 30, 1981, at 36 (describing competition in the air cargo industry and 
range of services offered by different companies). 
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Similarly, FedEx was successful in the broad effort to establish 
national regulation of aircraft noise, but the structure of ANCA was 
particularly beneficial to FedEx.  First, national regulation virtually 
eliminated local restrictions on flights such as curfews, which were 
burdensome for the air cargo industry and particularly for FedEx due 
to the nature of its business model.  Second, the price for national 
regulation was a national policy that required the airline industry to 
reduce aircraft noise through the use of quieter planes and engines.  
These reductions were expensive.  As one of the largest air cargo 
carriers subject to the regulation, FedEx could more easily bear the 
costs of the regulation than its smaller competitors; indeed, the 
regulation effectively increased the barriers to new entry into the air 
cargo industry.  Third, FedEx successfully persuaded regulators to 
adopt a performance-based approach to regulation.  Performance 
standards both allowed FedEx to continue to use its older airplanes 
and offered FedEx the opportunity to profit by selling hush kits to 
other carriers. 
One might characterize these particularized benefits for FedEx 
as special interest legislation.  Alternatively, they may be understood 
as a subsidy for FedEx’s political activity.  By providing FedEx with 
specific benefits, the statutes allowed FedEx to overcome the freerider 
problem presented by allocating firm specific political capital to broad-
based regulatory initiatives.  Although this analysis clearly does not 
extend to all legislation that provides particularized benefits to a 
limited number of firms, it suggests that statutory benefits must be 
evaluated within the cost structure of political activity and the 
relationship between that activity and marketplace competition. 
 CONCLUSION 
Academics are a long way from understanding the political 
process and the role of corporations within that process.  The mixed, 
complex, and often opaque motives of political actors create 
substantial obstacles to studying the effects of corporate political 
activity.  At the same time, it is difficult to get a handle on the scope of 
corporate political activity and to identify the range of corporate 
activities that are designed to influence the political process.  
Nonetheless, increasing levels of political participation by 
corporations, which in turn lead to ever-increasing campaign finance 
regulations, demand a better understanding of corporate political 
activity. 
This Article offers a modest starting point for developing a 
broader framework of analysis.  The Article uses a case study 
  
1570 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:5:1495 
methodology to look inside the black box and to explore the nature of 
corporate participation in the political process.  The case study 
provides the first detailed analysis of the manner in which a 
corporation develops and deploys its political capital across a range of 
policy initiatives.  The analysis provides valuable insights as to the 
breadth of activities that influence legislative policymaking, the 
interrelationship of those activities, and their potential effectiveness, 
both in achieving the corporation’s desired policy objectives and in 
enhancing its market position.  In particular, the FedEx story 
provides powerful evidence that political participation is an important 
component of corporate business strategy. 
There are several key implications of the FedEx story.  First, 
the case study predicts that existing regulatory efforts to limit 
corporate political participation are unlikely to succeed, both because 
they use an artificially narrow conception of political participation and 
because of the relationship between a corporation’s market and 
nonmarket activities.  Second, it suggests that such efforts may be 
misguided in that advocates of such restrictions overstate the social 
costs of corporate political participation and overlook the ways in 
which such participation may enhance the legislative process.  Finally, 
the study reveals several factors that policymakers should consider in 
their efforts to regulate corporate political activity, including 
transparency, provision of information, and firm specialization with 
respect to political capital. 
Regulation has become an important factor for U.S. businesses.  
As a result, corporate political activity must be integrated within a 
corporation’s overall business strategy, and corporations need to 
develop and manage their political capital in the same way that they 
manage other business assets.  The FedEx story demonstrates the 
importance of politics to business and explains the growing 
investment by corporations in political capital.  It further explains 
how the business world has responded, and will continue to respond, 
to regulatory restrictions by developing alternative mechanisms for 
exerting political influence.  By understanding how and why 
corporations participate in politics, policymakers can better address 
concerns about the effect of corporate political influence. 
 
